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SAMENVATTING 
 Situaties zijn talrijk waarbij consumenten overgaan tot een stapsgewijze inkrimping van 
het aantal keuzemogelijkheden, en dit door het wegstrepen van alternatieven die niet voldoen 
aan welbepaalde criteria. Intuïtief zou men veronderstellen dat eens een keuzemogelijkheid 
geschrapt is van de lijst, zij geen invloed zal hebben op het verdere keuzeproces, en 
meerbepaald op de finale keuze. Dit proefschrift doet een beroep op een fenomeen dat 
uitvoerig bestudeerd is in de wetenschappelijke literatuur, namelijk “keuze gestuurd door 
context”. Hieruit blijkt dat het toevoegen van een extra keuzemogelijkheid aan een lijst met 
twee opties, de oorspronkelijke keuze tussen deze twee kan wijzigen, en dit door het creëren 
van welbepaalde relaties tussen de opties. Twee voorbeelden van dergelijke relaties zijn 
“asymmetric dominance” en “compromise”, respectievelijk gedefinieerd als “de extra 
keuzemogelijkheid is gedomineerd door slechts één van beide oorspronkelijke opties, waarbij 
de term gedomineerd aangeeft dat deze extra optie slechter scoort op tenminste één van de 
aanwezige productkenmerken en een gelijke of slechtere score behaalt op al de overige 
kenmerken” en “één van beide oorspronkelijke opties wordt een tussenoplossing, hetgeen 
inhoudt dat haar productscores gelegen zijn tussen die van de overige opties.” In het kader 
van deze twee contexten, toont een eerste studie aan dat de aanwezigheid van een “absoluut 
onaanvaardbare” optie in de lijst de finale keuze tussen de overige alternatieven wel degelijk 
stuurt. Een absoluut onaanvaardbare optie is hier gedefinieerd als “een product dat niet 
voldoet aan een zekere minimum eis voor een welbepaald kenmerk en hierdoor wordt 
verworpen wat ook haar scores op de overige kenmerken mogen zijn.” Een tweede studie 
richt zich vervolgens op het doen afnemen van deze vertekenende invloed van de absoluut 
onaanvaardbare optie op de finale keuze (toegepast op de “asymmetric dominance” context), 
en dit door het benadrukken van de onaanvaardbaarheid van de optie. Ten gevolge van deze 
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extra aandacht wordt de respondent zich misschien bewust van een mogelijke beïnvloeding 
door de onaanvaardbare optie, hetgeen vervolgens kan leiden tot correctie. Concreet wordt 
aan de respondenten gevraagd om in een eerste stap absoluut onaanvaardbare scores en 
overeenkomstige opties aan te duiden, en om in een tweede stap een keuze te maken uit een 
lijst waarin deze onaanvaardbare opties nog steeds zijn opgenomen en waarbij de 
onaanvaardbare scores in het rood vermeld staan, aangevuld met een rode asterisk. De 
bekomen correctie blijkt slechts matig te zijn.  
 Deze eerste twee studies suggereren dat een onaanvaardbaar alternatief in de lijst de 
finale keuze tussen de overige alternatieven stuurt, en zelfs het vestigen van extra aandacht 
op deze onaanvaardbare status lijkt dit effect niet teniet te doen (hetgeen mogelijk wijst op 
een onbewust onderliggend proces). Een derde studie bevat een strengere test van het effect 
van de onaanvaardbare optie door de onaanvaardbaarheid van de optie reeds van bij aanvang 
duidelijk te stellen, in die zin dat de respondenten de overige scores van deze optie niet 
moeten bekijken alvorens dit te ontdekken. Aan de respondenten werd gevraagd om zich in te 
beelden dat ze een digitale fotocamera gingen kopen voor een goede vriend(in), rekening 
houdend met zijn (haar) eisen (b.v., “Ik wil zeker een broekzak model. Elk groter of kleiner 
model is voor mij absoluut onaanvaardbaar, dus ik wil niet dat je een dergelijke camera voor 
mij koopt wat ook de scores op de overige kenmerken mogen zijn”) en voorkeuren. Het 
hanteren van een restrictie enkel ten aanzien van het kenmerk “grootte”, in combinatie met 
zijn linkse positie in de keuzematrix, verzekerde dat dit kenmerk eerst bekeken werd in de 
loop van het keuzeproces. Onder deze strictere operationalisatie bleef een effect van de 
onaanvaardbare optie op de finale keuze uit (en dit voor zowel de “asymmetric dominance” 
als de “compromise” context). Het is nu echter mogelijk dat de eerder rechttoe, rechtaan 
instructies gegeven door de onderzoeker (onder het mom van de goede vriend(in)) met 
betrekking tot de grootte van de camera (zie termen zoals “absoluut onaanvaardbaar” en “wat 
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ook de scores op de overige kenmerken mogen zijn”), een “demand effect” hebben 
veroorzaakt. Dit houdt in dat de respondenten misschien dachten dat er van hen verwacht 
werd dat ze de niet-broekzak modellen onmiddellijk zouden schrappen van de lijst, inclusief 
de verdere informatie die deze modellen bevatten (onder de vorm van de scores op de overige 
kenmerken).  
 Toekomstig onderzoek kan een oplossing bieden voor dit mogelijk “demand effect” 
probleem door een minder expliciete onaanvaardbaarheid instructie te gebruiken, er wel zorg 
voor dragend dat de onaanvaardbaarheid van bij aanvang duidelijk is. Zo kan bijvoorbeeld de 
plattegrond van een studentenkamer een restrictie weergeven ten aanzien van de grootte van 
een koelkast, en het zo mogelijk maken om woorden zoals “absoluut onaanvaardbaar” en 
“restrictie” te bannen uit de inleiding. Het is dan aan de respondent om bij het kiezen van een 
koelkast zelf de beperking ten aanzien van de grootte in rekening te brengen. Daarenboven 
kan een toekomstige studie de mate van cognitieve elaboratie manipuleren om zo te 
onderzoeken of de invloed van de onaanvaardbare optie steunt op een onderliggend 
onbewust, of bewust correctie proces afhankelijk van de specifieke context die ontstaat door 
de toevoeging ervan aan de lijst. Studie 3 bevat een eerste, voorzichtige analyse die in die 
richting wijst. 
Samengevat, het al dan niet beïnvloeden van het verdere keuzeproces door de 
onaanvaardbare optie hangt af van factoren zoals: is de onaanvaardbare status duidelijk van 
bij aanvang, worden de overige scores van de onaanvaardbare optie verder bekeken 
(eventueel onbewust), en veroorzaken de specifieke relaties tussen de keuzeopties al dan niet 
een onderliggend proces dat bewust is, en dus een correctie of een verderzetting van de 
impact van de onaanvaardbare optie. Hopelijk leidt het inzicht verworven in dit proefschrift 
tot een meer geïntegreerd raamwerk ten aanzien van de rol die absoluut onaanvaardbare 
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opties spelen in keuzeprocessen, waarbij de eerder aangehaalde suggesties voor verder 
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SUMMARY 
In many situations consumers engage in a phased narrowing of choice options, editing 
out options that fail to meet some acceptable criteria. Intuition would suggest that once an 
option has been edited out of the choice set, it should not have any impact on subsequent 
choices. This dissertation draws upon a well-known phenomenon called “context effects on 
choice” that shows that the introduction of an additional option in the choice set changes the 
choice between the original pair of options by creating specific relationships between the 
options in the set. “Asymmetric dominance” and “compromise” are two such relationships, 
the former defined as “the additional option is dominated by only one of the two original op-
tions, with dominated meaning that it scores worse on at least one attribute and is equivalent 
or inferior on all other attributes,” and the latter as “one of the two original options becomes a 
middle option, meaning that its attribute values are between the values of the other alterna-
tives” respectively. For the case of these particular contexts, study 1 shows that the presence 
of a “truly unacceptable” option in the choice set influences the final choice between the re-
maining options. A truly unacceptable option is defined as “an alternative not satisfying a 
minimum acceptable threshold on a rejection inducing dimension, such that the option would 
be rejected by the decision maker regardless of its other features.” Study 2 focuses on reduc-
ing the unacceptable option’s contaminating effect on final choice (for the asymmetric domi-
nance setting), attempting to trigger a correction process by making the option’s unaccepta-
bility more salient in the set. Participants are asked to mark truly unacceptable levels and cor-
responding options in an initial phase, and they subsequently make a choice within a set still 
listing the screened out option(s) with the unacceptable level(s) in red and marked with a red 
asterisk. Only a moderate correction of the unacceptable’s influence is found.  
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In combination, studies 1 and 2 suggest that the presence of a truly unacceptable option 
in the choice set affects the final choice between the remaining alternatives and that even 
drawing people’s attention to the option’s unacceptable status does not seem to nullify its 
effect (perhaps suggesting a nonconscious process). Study 3 provides a stronger test of the 
unacceptable option’s effect by making the unacceptable status clear from the beginning, so 
that individuals do not have to process values other than the unacceptable aspect before find-
ing this out. For this participants had to imagine that they had been asked by their best friend 
to buy him/her a digital photo camera, with the friend listing demands (e.g., “I definitely want 
a pocket-sized model. Any larger or smaller model is truly unacceptable to me, so I don’t 
want you to buy such a camera for me no matter what else it has to offer”) and preferences 
with regard to the camera. The introduction of a constraint on the size attribute, together with 
its left position in the choice matrix, assured it was the first attribute focused on during the 
choice process. Under this more stringent condition an effect of the unacceptable option on 
the subsequent choice was no longer found (this holds for both the asymmetric dominance 
and the compromise setting). However, the rather blatant instructions given by the experi-
menter (under the guise of the friend) with regard to the camera’s size level (using terms such 
as “truly unacceptable to me”, “don’t want you to buy such a camera”, and “no matter what 
else it has to offer”) might have created a demand effect. That is, participants might have felt 
they were expected to immediately prune a medium-sized camera from the decision structure, 
together with the further information it contains.   
The above issue could be resolved in a future study, using a less explicit unacceptability 
instruction, still making sure that the unacceptable status is clear from the beginning. For ex-
ample, a student flat’s floor plan could be used to introduce a constraint on the refrigerator’s 
size, as such excluding words such as “truly unacceptable” and “constraint” from the intro-
duction. It is up to the participants to take the size constraint into account at the moment they 
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are deciding between the different refrigerators in the choice table, which is thought to be a 
common practice in daily life. In addition this future study could manipulate the level of cog-
nitive elaboration participants engage in to examine whether the unacceptable option’s influ-
ence runs through a nonconscious versus conscious correction process depending upon how 
the unacceptable option adds to the final choice context (i.e., by making one of the original 
options a dominating or a compromise option), as suggested by some preliminary findings in 
study 3. 
 In sum, whether unacceptable options affect further decision making is dependent upon 
factors such as whether the unacceptable status is clear from the beginning, whether values 
other than the unacceptable aspect are examined further (perhaps unconsciously), and wheth-
er the type of relationship defined between the options in the set by the addition of the unac-
ceptable option causes the underlying process to be conscious or not, thus leading to a correc-
tion or a continuation of the unacceptable option’s effect. Hopefully, the knowledge gathered 
in this dissertation leads to a more integrated framework for the role of unacceptable options 
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CHAPTER I :  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine that Mr. Jones wants to buy a digital photo camera and uses a recommendation 
agent website to find the brand that suits him best. On the website, he first defines his desires, 
including levels of attributes that are truly unacceptable (e.g., the desired size is pocket size, 
and a model of another size will not be bought no matter what else it has to offer; figure 1). 
Subsequently, the website recommends a list of brands. How will Mr. Jones choose when this 
list includes an option with a truly unacceptable size (e.g., a medium-sized camera)? Defining 
“truly unacceptable” as one which Mr. Jones in fact will not choose, the question we raise is 
whether he will choose a different brand from the one he would have chosen if this truly un-
acceptable option were not included. That is, does the presence of a truly unacceptable option 
in the choice set affect the consumer’s choice among the remaining options?  
 
Figure 1: Problem specification – Truly unacceptable option included/excluded 
 
 







C T D C T 
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Intuitively, such truly unacceptable options should not influence final decision making, 
yet the use of these options in the real world (e.g., compusa.com, activebuyersguide.com, my-
productadvisor.com) suggests that they may be effective at influencing subsequent behavior.  
In the decision making literature, a common assumption is that truly unacceptable op-
tions are eliminated in an initial editing phase and do not influence subsequent choices (e.g., 
Lussier and Olshavsky 1979; Nichols-Hoppe and Beach 1990; Olshavsky 1979; Park 1978; 
Payne 1976). We argue for a more subtle role for the truly unacceptable option, namely that 
information characterizing the unacceptable can play a role in the further decision process by 
helping to define the context (i.e., the relationships between the options in the set) within 
which the final choice is made.  
Another example of a so-called “irrelevant and nonessential” option is the “phantom” al-
ternative, defined by Pratkanis and Farquhar (1992) as “a choice option that looks real but is 
unavailable at the time a decision is made.” Examples of phantoms include the withdrawal of 
a preferred job candidate and the liked product being out-of-stock. Farquhar and Pratkanis 
(1993) argue that many current theories hold that unavailable alternatives should be pruned 
from the decision structure (e.g., Luce’s (1959) choice axiom and Hammond’s (1986) conse-
quentialism). Such principles would lead not only to the elimination of the phantoms them-
selves but also to the information they might contain about the context of decision making or 
about constraints on the availability of options. They include the following concrete example: 
“newcomers to a community often compare a range of options currently for sale on the real 
estate market. Before evaluating properties, it is useful though to compare several properties 
that have recently sold (i.e., phantoms) with the currently available alternatives.” The im-
portance of this information follows from the fact that research has shown phantom alterna-
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tives to impact consumer judgment and choice (e.g., Farquhar and Pratkanis 1993; Fitzsimons 
2000; Highhouse 1996; Pettibone and Wedell 2000). 
The conclusions reached for the phantom alternative do not automatically hold for the 
truly unacceptable option, however. An unacceptable option is an “inferior” irrelevant alterna-
tive and the unavailable phantom is a “superior” irrelevant alternative. Following Seidl and 
Traub (1996) an inferior irrelevant alternative can be defined as “an alternative that is added 
to the choice set, but where this alternative is, because of its obvious inferiority, never cho-
sen”, and a superior irrelevant alternative as “a choice alternative which is considered to be a 
best choice. However, in the course of the decision process it becomes apparent that it is not 
available; for some reason it drops out of the set of choice alternatives.” Whether an alterna-
tive is strictly inferior or is superior but not available may influence the decision process in 
different ways.  
An influence of the truly unacceptable option on final choice would run counter to nor-
mative models of choice asserting that preferences are determined only by relevant alterna-
tives and guided by an internal, stable utility function. Instead it would be consistent with the 
notion of constructed choice processes (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), the new “standard 
model” for behaviorally-oriented consumer researchers. For example, the phenomenon of 
preference reversals, showing in the domain of gambles that people will often choose gamble 
A over B but pay more for B than A when the options are priced separately (Lichtenstein and 
Slovic 1971; Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988), has led to the suggestion that choice is less 
about choosing with regard to an underlying set of preferences than it is about constructing 
preferences at the time the choice is made (Griffin, Liu, and Khan 2005).  
The influence of truly unacceptable options on the decision process has both theoretical 
and managerial importance. Theoretically, the presence of truly unacceptable options influ-
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ences the definition of the choice context and which particular option is chosen from the final 
reduced set; such influence should make the role of the unacceptable option in choice an im-
portant focus in decision making research. From another perspective, the distinct role of con-
text in decision making would once again be confirmed, as context will matter even if it is 
defined by an option that is truly unacceptable. Managerially, knowledge of the effect of the 
unacceptable on the further process may lead to the addition of a truly unacceptable (perhaps 
even imagined) option to the set (e.g., by a recommendation agent such as activebuy-
ersguide.com), not to generate direct sales, as the option will never be chosen, but to increase 
the profitability of the product line by influencing the consumer to buy the more profitable 
option. To serve consumers’ interests it may be advisable to make them aware of such biasing 
practices; when confronted with unacceptable options in the set, consumers should ask them-
selves the following questions and debias if appropriate: what does the source of my infor-
mation have to gain? Why is this particular option being presented to me (in this way)? 
Would my final choice be different if the unacceptable option and the information it contains 
were eliminated from the start?  
The present dissertation is organized as follows: first, we take a look at the relevant de-
cision making literature. Second, we define a truly unacceptable option, to subsequently in-
troduce the well-known context effects, asymmetric dominance and compromise. Then we 
show how they are affected by the unacceptable option to test the proposition that unaccepta-
ble options influence the choice process between the remaining options in the choice set by 
helping to define the choice context. We then develop alternative hypotheses regarding 
whether the unacceptable option impacts final choice (chapter 2). Next, we present results of a 
first study examining these hypotheses, followed by two additional studies (chapter 3), de-
tailed further in figure 2. Finally, we conclude with a summary and general discussion (chap-
ter 4).   
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Figure 2: Analytical road map 
 
Proposition: 
The truly unacceptable option influences the further choice between the remain-
ing options in the choice set by adding to the final choice context. 
 
Study 1: 
Effect of unacceptable op-
tion on final choice, for both 
context settings (i.e., asym-
metric dominance and com-
promise). 
Study 2: 
Effect of unacceptable option on final 
choice is only marginally reduced by mak-
ing the unacceptable status salient, which 
is aimed at triggering a correction process 
(for the asymmetric dominance setting).  
 
Saliency is obtained by having participants 
mark truly unacceptable levels and corre-
sponding options and subsequently 
choose from a set still listing the screened 
out option(s), with unacceptable level(s) in 
red and marked with a red asterisk. 
Study 3: 
Effect of unacceptable option on final 
choice is eliminated for both context 
settings by making the unacceptable 
status clear up front, so that the indiivid-
ual does not have to process values 
other than the unacceptable aspect be-
fore finding this out.  
 
The unacceptable option’s biasing effect 
seems to increase (decrease) for in-
creasing elaboration levels in the case of 
asymmetric dominance (compromise), 
suggesting a nonconscious (conscious, 
correction inducing) underlying process. 
Cognitive elaboration is measured by 
way of process accountability.  
Future research: 
Use of a less blatant unacceptability 
instruction to solve a possible demand 
effect. Manipulate cognitive elaboration 
to further examine the type of underlying 
process, depending upon how the unac-
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CHAPTER II :  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
II.1 A LOOK AT THE DECISION MAKING LITERATURE 
Several decades of research have contributed to the decision making literature as we 
know it today. During this time the consumer has evolved from a rational decision maker to a 
decision maker with bounded rationality, an adaptive or constructive decision maker, and a 
more unconscious one.  
II.1.1 THE RATIONAL DECISION MAKER AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
“The rational decision maker has well defined preferences that do not depend on par-
ticular descriptions of the options or on the specific methods used to elicit those preferences. 
Each option in the choice set is assumed to have a utility, or subjective value, that depends 
only on the option. Finally, it is assumed that the consumer has ability or skill in computation 
that enables the calculation of which option will maximize his or her received value and se-
lects accordingly.” (Bettman et al. 1998) This normative point of view of consumers having 
stable and well defined tastes (Simonson 2005) and maximizing utility was challenged by 
Simon in 1955. He argued that decision makers have limitations on their capacity for pro-
cessing information, including limited working memory and limited computational capabili-
ties. This concept of bounded rationality implies that the decision maker does not have a mas-
ter list of preferences, that are merely revealed when making a choice, but that preferences 
will be constructed on the spot (Bettman et al. 1998). There is not one invariant algorithm 
(e.g., the weighted adding model; for a defintion see below) that is applied to all choices, in-
stead several different approaches will be used critically depending upon the properties of the 
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task environment (Payne 1982). As a consequence, choice may become dependent upon such 
irrelevant factors as the options’ descriptions (e.g., framing outcomes as gains versus losses) 
or the elicitation methods used (e.g. choose versus determine a price), as such violating the 
normative principles of “description invariance” and “procedure invariance”. An example of 
the framing effect is the following (Tversky and Kahneman 1986): respondents are asked to 
assume themselves $300 richer and are then offered a choice between a sure gain of $100 or 
an equal chance to win $200 or nothing. Alternatively, they are asked to assume themselves 
$500 richer and are offered a choice between a sure loss of $100 and an equal chance to lose 
$200 or nothing. Although these two problems are essentially identical with respect to the 
final outcome, most participants who choose between gains predictably prefer the $100 for 
sure, whereas most participants who choose between losses prefer the probabilistic $200 
gamble. Because outcomes can be framed either as gains or as losses relative to some refer-
ence point, and because risk attitudes vary depending upon whether gains or losses are at 
stake (i.e., risk-averse attitudes in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of loss-
es), alternative frames may lead to contradictory preferences with respect to the final outcome 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986). 
II.1.2 THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 
 The different strategies used by an individual when making a judgment or a choice may 
be categorized on four different aspects (Payne et al. 1992): (1) the total amount of infor-
mation processed, ranging from exhaustive consideration of all available information to more 
cursory consideration of a subset of the information. For example, a digital photo camera 
choice may involve a detailed screening of much of the information available about each of 
the cameras, or it may show only a superficial consideration of a limited set of information 
(e.g., choosing the brand one chose last time out of a set of three different brands); (2) the 
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selectivity in information processing, that is the degree to which the same amount of infor-
mation is examined for each alternative or attribute (consistent processing) or the amount var-
ies (selective processing). For example, suppose Mr. Jones wants to buy a digital photo cam-
era and considers the cameras presented in figure 1. He decides that optical zoom is the most 
important attribute, processes only the information on this attribute, and finally chooses model 
C, as this option obtains the best score on the optical zoom attribute. This choice process in-
volves highly selective processing of attribute information (since the amount of information 
examined differs across attributes: all levels of the optical zoom attribute are examined, 
whereas none of the levels of the resolution attribute are looked at) but consistent processing 
of alternative model information (as one piece of information is considered for each camera: 
the optical zoom score is looked at for models C, T and D); (3) the pattern of processing, 
whether by alternative (several attributes of a particular option are considered before another 
alternative is examined) or by attribute (values of several alternatives on a single attribute are 
processed before information on another attribute is examined). For example, Mr. Jones might 
examine the resolution score of each of the three cameras, concluding that model T has the 
most megapixels and model C the least, as such showing attribute-based processing. The oth-
er way round, Mr. Jones could process in an alternative-based fashion by examining the price, 
resolution, optical zoom, camera size and auto focus of model C in order to form an overall 
impression of that camera; and (4) whether the strategy is compensatory, meaning that a good 
value on one attribute can compensate for a poor value on another, as such requiring explicit 
trade-offs among attributes, or noncompensatory, implying that a good value on one attribute 
cannot make up for a poor value on another. In case of a noncompensatory strategy, if Mr. 
Jones decides not to buy a medium-sized camera, then model D will not be chosen regardless 
of the interesting ratings it may have on price, resolution, optical zoom or auto focus. In case 
of a compensatory strategy, Mr. Jones may be willing to consider the medium-sized camera if 
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compensated by a high enough number of pixels, as such requiring an explicit trade-off be-
tween camera size and resolution. Bettman et al. (1998) presents an overview of consumer 
decision strategies and their properties, two of which will be detailed next.   
 The “weighted adding strategy” (WAD) assumes that the consumer assesses the im-
portance of each attribute and assigns a subjective value to each possible attribute level. This 
strategy then consists of considering one alternative at a time, examining each of the attributes 
for that option, multiplying each attribute’s subjective value times its importance weight, and 
summing these products across all of the attributes to obtain an overall value for each option. 
These overall values will subsequently be compared and the alternative with the highest value 
will be chosen. This same procedure is used to compute the attitudinal component of 
Fishbein’s behavioral intention model (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Miniard and Cohen 1983). 
In terms of the four aspects differentiating decision strategies as detailed above, weighted 
adding is characterized by extensive, consistent (not selective), alternative-based, and com-
pensatory processing. Because of these characteristics weighted adding is often considered to 
be more normatively accurate than heuristics that do not possess these characteristics (Frisch 
and Clemen 1994). Weighted adding, however, places greater demands on consumers’ work-
ing memory and computational capabilities. “Elimination-by-aspects” (EBA) eliminates op-
tions that do not meet a minimum cutoff value for the most important attribute. This elimina-
tion process is repeated for the second most important attribute, with processing continuing 
until a single option remains (Tversky 1972). This more heuristic strategy is attribute-based, 
noncompensatory, and often characterized by less extensive and more selective processing. 
The decision maker’s limited working memory effectively requires such selective attention to 
information.  
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II.1.2.A COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK 
 A major early empirical finding of decision research was that the same individual will 
use diverse strategies to make a judgment or choice (Abelson and Levi 1985). People seem to 
have a repertoire or toolkit of strategies, and these strategies will be used in a contingent fash-
ion, depending upon the properties of the situation (e.g., simplifying heuristics are more likely 
for more complex, difficult problems such as more alternatives in the set; Payne 1982). A 
framework that seemed particularly suited to explain this contingent information processing 
was the cost-benefit approach, with “cost” primarily referring to the effort required to use a 
rule and “benefit” to the ability of a strategy to select the best alternative (Beach and Mitchell 
1978; Russo and Dosher 1983); this approach introduced an effort goal in addition to an accu-
racy goal, in line with Simon’s bounded rationality notion. Furthermore, because the required 
effort and the resulting accuracy of various strategies vary across different problems, the cost-
benefit perspective seemed very well capable to explain why decision strategies vary across 
situations (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988). Monte-Carlo simulations were run computing 
the required effort and the obtained accuracy of different strategies in various decision envi-
ronments. With respect to effort, decision strategies were decomposed into elementary infor-
mation processes, such as reading a piece of information, weighting information, multiplying 
or adding values, and comparing two values in line with Newell and Simon’s (1972) infor-
mation processing theory of problem solving. A weighted adding strategy, for example, ap-
plied to the choice matrix shown in figure 1 (focusing solely on the attributes resolution and 
optical zoom) would be decomposed into (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993, chapter 3): 
reading the weight of the resolution attribute, reading the resolution value of model C, multi-
ply these two numbers and retain the score. The same would be done for the optical zoom 
attribute, that is read the weight and the optical zoom values, multiply these two numbers and 
retain the score. The two scores computed this way would then be added and kept as the cur-
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rent best alternative. For models T and D the same operations would be applied. The final 
choice is then based on comparing the final scores for each of the three options. Thus, in total 
we have 12 reads, six multiplications, three adds and two comparisons. Accuracy was meas-
ured by comparing to the normative choice based on WAD. The outcome of a simulation ex-
ercise is presented in figure 3, showing for five different strategies how their required effort 
and obtained accuracy change for an increase in the number of alternatives in the choice set. 
Payne et al. (1993, chapter 4) concluded that the accuracy of the heuristics is fairly robust as 
the number of alternatives increases, and that the effort required for heuristics grows less rap-
idly than that required for a normative procedure like weighted adding. Thus, heuristics seem 
relatively more efficient as the number of alternatives increases.  
Figure 3: The effects of number of alternatives on the relative accuracy and number of 
operations of choice heuristics 
 
Source: Payne, John W., Eric J. Johnson, James R. Bettman, and Eloise Coupey (1990), “Understand-
ing Contingent Choice: A Computer Simulation Approach,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics, 20 (2), 303. 
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 Actual processing data were collected using participants’ verbal protocols (Gertzen 
1992) and information acquisition patterns (using mouselab
1
; Payne et al. 1988) to verify 
whether the strategy applied by the decision maker in a particular situation corresponded to 
the one suggested by the simulation on the basis of the effort-accuracy framework. The 
framework received strong empirical support. The major findings of these formal modeling 
exercises and some of the early empirical studies can be classified into two groups: (1) con-
sumer choice research on “problem difficulty” and (2) research on “response mode”.  
PROBLEM DIFFICULTY 
Research on problem difficulty covers a whole range of issues, such as problem size, 
time pressure, information format, attribute correlation, completeness of information, and 
comparable versus noncomparable choices (Bettman et al. 1998); the first three will be fo-
cused on below.  
PROBLEM DIFFICULTY - PROBLEM SIZE 
Problem size is characterized by the number of options in the set and the number of at-
tributes across which they vary. Payne (1976) found that, when faced with a large number of 
alternatives (six or 12), decision makers first use less cognitively demanding decision strate-
gies to eliminate unacceptable alternatives until only a few alternatives are left as candidates 
                                                 
 
1
 Mouselab (www.mouselabweb.org) is a program that presents participants with a matrix on a computer screen, 
where the alternatives under consideration are typically the columns of the matrix, and the different attributes of 
choice are the rows. The actual information is hidden from view (i.e., the cells of the matrix are blank), and the 
decision maker must actively decide to learn any specific piece of information by clicking on a particular cell of 
the matrix with a mouse. Every action the decision maker takes is recorded by the computer, so that at the end 
there is a complete record of what the decision maker accessed, how long every piece of information was con-
sidered, and the order in which every piece of information was examined (Carroll and Johnson 1990).  
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for choice. Subsequently, decision makers use more cognitively demanding strategies to 
choose between the remaining alternatives. Thus consumers use a noncompensatory strategy 
(e.g., EBA) in an initial phase to eliminate some alternatives, and a compensatory one (e.g., 
WAD) in a second phase to analyze the survivors in more detail. Payne’s (1976) view of a 
phased decision process has found support from many other behavioral researchers in psy-
chology and marketing (e.g., Bettman and Park 1980; Corbin 1980; Lopes 1995; Lussier and 
Olshavsky 1979; Olshavsky 1979; Payne and Braunstein 1978; Svenson 1979; Wright and 
Barbour 1977).  
Phased processing implies that consumers react to problem size (defined by number of 
options) by being selective. Payne (1976) found that the percentage of information searched 
declined as the number of alternatives available in a decision situation increased. When the 
participants were asked to choose between just two alternatives, they always searched the 
same amount of information on each alternative. In multialternative choice situations (six or 
12 alternatives), a greater number of dimensions of information was examined for some alter-
natives than for others in the same set of choice alternatives. In addition, the amount of avail-
able information searched was as great or greater for the alternative chosen than for any other 
alternative in the choice set. Studies by Olshavsky (1979) and Lussier and Olshavsky (1979) 
showed identical results. Johnson and Russo (1981, 1984) also showed that there is much 
more complete memory of the attributes of chosen alternatives as compared to rejected ones.  
With regard to the other problem size factor, the number of attributes, no change in 
choice rule was found for an increase in the number of features. Instead the available infor-
mation was weighted differentially to further simplify the choice task, even to the extent that 
several attributes were completely excluded from the process (Lussier and Olshavsky 1979; 
Olshavsky 1979; Payne 1976).  
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PROBLEM DIFFICULTY - TIME PRESSURE 
 Payne et al. (1988) conducted research on time pressure and suggested that there may be 
a hierarchy of responses to time constraints: “People may first attempt to simply accelerate 
their processing and try to do the same things faster. If the time pressure is too great for accel-
eration to suffice, individuals may next engage in filtration, focusing on a subset of the avail-
able information. Finally, people may change strategies when time pressures become ex-
treme.” Particularly interesting was the finding that under more severe time constraints sever-
al attribute-based heuristics such as elimination-by-aspects were more accurate than a norma-
tive procedure such as weighted adding, because the latter had to be truncated when it ran out 
of time. Thus quickly examining at least some information on each option seemed more effec-
tive than examining a limited set of options in depth (Bettman et al. 1998).  
PROBLEM DIFFICULTY - INFORMATION PRESENTATION FORMAT 
 The way information is displayed affects the processing strategy used. If information is 
displayed about alternatives sequentially, the decision maker has little choice but to engage in 
alternative-based decision strategies, while simultaneous presentation of information about 
several alternatives makes attribute-based search possible (Tversky 1969). Tversky argues 
that processing by attribute is easier because alternatives can be compared using the same 
units (since the same attribute is used). Evaluating each of two alternatives one at a time and 
comparing the two evaluations (processing by brand) is thus more difficult than developing a 
relative evaluation of the two alternatives on each attribute and eventually combining these 
relative evaluations over attributes, since the latter requires only half as many between attrib-
ute comparisons. In this context, Slovic (1972) suggested a “concreteness principle”: decision 
makers will tend to use only that information that is explicitly displayed and will use it in the 
form it is displayed, without transforming it. Such behavior would reduce the cognitive effort 
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required to process the information. This principle is supported by Bettman and Kakkar’s 
(1979) findings that individuals indeed acquired information in a manner consistent with the 
form of the display (by attribute or by brand). For example, with a display that encouraged 
alternative-based processing (i.e., booklets were prepared, one for each brand, showing the 
brand name on the front cover and containing further attribute information inside on different 
cards. These booklets were arranged on a long table so that the participant could walk back 
and forth in examining them, similar to the typical supermarket display) more alternative-
based processing was observed when examining the sequences of information cards acquired. 
Likewise, during an election campaign, watching a rally or speech or party convention for a 
single candidate provides primarily alternative-based information; a political debate, on the 
other hand, provides largely attribute-based information. The way of processing will follow 
the presentation formats (Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994).    
RESPONSE MODE 
 One of the main propositions of rational choice, as indicated at the outset of this theoret-
ical part, is that of “procedure invariance”: strategically equivalent ways of eliciting a prefer-
ence should reveal the same preference (Tversky et al. 1988). This principle does not seem to 
hold empirically, though. For example, a study by Mowen and Gentry (1980) shows that pref-
erences between two new product projects could be reversed depending on whether the deci-
sion maker was asked to choose one of the projects (i.e., pick the most preferred option) or 
designate a price for the rights to each project (i.e., provide an overall evaluation of each al-
ternative). The leading explanations for the observed preference reversals have to do with 
processing differences associated with the different response modes. The need to evaluate 
alternatives would lead to alternative-based searching and more quantitative thinking, while 
choosing among alternatives would lead to more attribute-based searching and more qualita-
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tive thinking (Fischer and Hawkins 1993; Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; Tversky 1969; 
Tversky et al. 1988). 
II.1.2.B CHOICE BASED ON REASONS 
 Next to the cost-benefit framework detailed above, the desire to explain one’s decision 
(to oneself or to others) may be drawn upon to clarify the construction of preferences and 
choice. As noted by Shafir, Simonson and Tversky (1993) in their article on reason-based 
choice: “Consumer decisions are often evaluated, either by others to whom one is accountable 
or by oneself. Hence, consumers often must be able to justify or to provide reasons for a deci-
sion.” Tversky and Shafir (1992), for example, ask participants to assume they just took a 
though qualifying exam. One group is told they passed, another group is told they failed, and 
a third group is told they will learn the results tomorrow. Each group is offered a choice 
among buying a vacation to Hawaii on sale today only, not buying the vacation, or paying $5 
to retain the right to buy the vacation package tomorrow. The majority of those who think 
they passed or failed the exam select the vacation, but the majority of those who don’t know 
the results want to retain the right to buy the vacation tomorrow, probably because they have 
no reason to purchase the package today.  
 Such reason-based choice seems particularly suited for choice problems that are more 
perceptual in nature, meaning a limited number of options and attributes presented in simple 
tables of numerical ratings (Bettman et al. 1998). A phenomenon that perfectly fits this de-
scription is the asymmetric dominance effect (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982; Huber and Puto 
1983), showing only two or three options and two attributes in a matrix format. For such sets 
it is possible to make comparisons in a simple, perceptual fashion, taking in the options “at a 
glance”. For example, the fact that camera model T dominates model D (figure 1) is then a 
good reason for choosing model T (it is clearly a better outcome than model D in terms of its 
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scores on resolution and optical zoom
2
; see the part on the definition of context effects for a 
more detailed description of the asymmetric dominance effect), and there is no need for a 
more complex explanation such as “I chose model T over C on the basis of trade-offs I had to 
make between the cameras’ resolution and optical zoom scores.” In line with this, Shafir et al. 
(1993) argued that relationships among options may be perceived to be more compelling rea-
sons or arguments for choice than deriving overall values for each option and choosing the 
option with the best value. Reason-based choice driving the asymmetric dominance effect also 
seems to be supported by Simonson’s (1989) studies showing an increase in the effect if par-
ticipants were told before the choice phase that they would have to justify their decision af-
terwards.  
 These so-called “relational heuristics”, however, pose serious threats to traditional 
choice theory (Luce 1959) and to modeling applications based on this theory. Changes in the 
set of options under consideration change the relationships among the options and therefore 
some of the potential reasons for choosing among the options. As such, changes in the deci-
sion context can alter the reasons that are salient and thus the choice made (Bettman et al. 
1998). The above mentioned asymmetric dominance effect is a perfect example of such con-
text-dependent preferences based on the relationships among the options. This however im-
plies that the classic assumption of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” no longer holds. 
More particularly, the “principle of proportionality” (i.e., if a new option is added to a choice 
set, the shares of the existing options will decrease in direct proportion to the size of the origi-
nal shares) and that of “regularity” (i.e., the addition of a new alternative cannot increase the 
probability of choosing a member of the original set) are violated by the finding that the addi-
tion of an asymmetrically dominated option to the choice set increases the choice share of the 
                                                 
 
2
 We do not focus on the camera size attribute yet. This attribute will play a role later on in the unacceptability 
manipulation.  
  
Gone But Not Forgotten: The Role of Unacceptable Options in Decision Making p. 23 
 
dominating alternative (e.g., the addition of camera model D to the two-option set increases 
the choice share of camera model T relative to that of model C; Huber et al. 1982).  
 A phenomenon that recently has been defined as the attribute-balance effect (Chernev 
2004, 2005) also fits within this reason-based decision making approach. Chernev (2005) 
gives the following example: “Consider a scenario in which choice alternatives are described 
by attributes using readily comparable metrics, say 100-point rating scales. In this scenario 
consumers are likely to compare not only the options’ values across different attributes but 
also attribute values within each of the options. As a result, an option with balanced attribute 
values (60, 60) tends to be perceived as less extreme than an option with values (70, 50), mak-
ing the balanced-option the likely choice outcome.” This effect is not depending upon the 
relational properties of the choice alternatives in the set (as is the case for the asymmetric 
dominance effect), but is derived from the option-specific dispersion of attribute values. Thus, 
the attribute-balance effect is relatively independent of the relative advantage of the options in 
the set because they are defined by an option’s internal properties rather than relative to the 
other choice alternatives (Chernev 2005). The attribute-balance effect and the relational heu-
ristics share certain similarities though, formulated by Chernev (2005) as follows: “both ef-
fects assume the presence of preference uncertainty, whereby the decision maker has difficul-
ty determining preference based on attribute weights and values alone, and both effects are a 
function of the dispersion of the attribute values describing choice alternatives rather than a 
function of individuals’ prior experience with the product.” 
II.1.2.C CHOICE BASED ON MINIMIZING NEGATIVE EMOTION 
A third and final factor in constructive preferences is that of minimizing the negative 
emotion that consumers experience when dealing with more difficult trade-offs or choices 
with severe consequences, for example, a parent trading off between his or her family’s safety 
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and the price when purchasing a car (Luce 1998). Increased trade-off difficulty leads to in-
creased processing that is more attribute-based due to avoidance of trade-offs (i.e., attribute-
based processing minimizes confronting the possibility that one attribute must be sacrificed to 
gain on another, whereas alternative-based processing highlights such trade-offs; Luce, 
Bettman, and Payne 1997), more avoidance of choice such as increased choice of an asym-
metrically dominating alternative or a greater tendency to prolong search (Luce 1998), and 
less willingness to trade quality for price (Luce, Payne, and Bettman 1999). 
The goals of maximizing accuracy, minimizing effort, maximizing the ease of justifica-
tion and minimizing the experience of negative emotion together constitute the “choice goals 
framework” (Bettman et al. 1998) that provides a theoretical foundation for the constructed 
choice processes model and opposes many of the notions underlying the classical rational 
choice model. Whereas the choice goals framework and effort-accuracy trade-offs in particu-
lar involve a more controlled and cognitive approach to decision making (Lynch 2005), the 
literature has more recently put more emphasis on the nonconscious aspects of decision mak-
ing. More generally, although recent major surveys of consumer research (Cohen and 
Chakravarti 1990; Jacoby, Johar, and Morrin 1998; Simonson et al. 2001) still report that the 
major emphasis is on purchase decisions, with a dominant cognitive approach to understand-
ing how they are made, Bargh (2002) warns that “to the extent that consumers are behaving 
without conscious awareness and guidance, models that assume the consumer’s deliberate and 
effortful scrutiny of the choice or behavior will likely miss much of the character and flavor 
of consumer behavior in situ.” 
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II.1.3 THE NONCONSCIOUS DECISION MAKER 
Increasingly, research has shown that a large part of consumer decision making occurs 
outside of conscious awareness or is influenced by factors unrecognized by the decision mak-
er (Fitzsimons et al. 2002). Some examples are given below that illustrate such nonconscious 
decision making.  
II.1.3.A SOME EXAMPLES OF NONCONSCIOUS DECISION MAKING 
Sen and Johnson (1997) found that the possession of a rebate coupon (i.e., a $15 gift 
certificate to one of the local area restaurants) prior to restaurant choice (i.e., choice between 
three restaurants scored on the attributes food quality, and service and atmosphere) enhanced 
consumers’ preference for the couponed restaurant. In addition, these mere possession effects 
were stronger for meaningful tasks (operationalized by way of expertise and liking for the 
category, using three seven-point Likert items) where consumers were likely to exhibit more 
care in considering information. This reinforcement (instead of the expected reduction) of the 
bias was interpreted as the effect being due to an underlying automatic process. To minimize 
any potential demand effects resulting from participants’ inferences regarding the relative 
desirability of the couponed option, they were asked to pick one of three sealed but unmarked 
envelopes. While participants were told that each envelope contained a different gift certifi-
cate, all envelopes contained the same coupon. Finally, to reduce the potential transparency of 
the task, similar “filler” tasks were used involving attributes such as dress code, distance and 
safety.  
The study by Fitzsimons and Shiv (2001) showed that when consumers responded to 
hypothetical questions (viz. normatively irrelevant questions), the content of the question had 
a substantial impact on subsequent actual behavior despite the fact respondents were clearly 
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aware the question was pure hypothetical. In a first study they investigated voting behavior 
presenting a choice between two political candidates running for office in Kansas. Before 
being asked to vote, participants from the hypothetical-question condition read the following 
question: “If you learned that candidate A had been convicted of fraud in 1988 on a charge 
stemming from several illegal donations accepted and subsequently misrepresented during his 
successful campaign for state treasurer, would your opinion of him increase or decrease?” 
Participants registered their response using a slide bar with end points “become more nega-
tive” versus “become more positive” and a midpoint labeled “wouldn’t change”, scaled from 
1 to 99. When compared to the no-information condition, the choice of candidate A was lower 
in the hypothetical-question condition. A second study involved an actual choice between a 
piece of chocolate cake with cherry topping and a serving of fruit salad, with this choice being 
perceived by participants as external to the experiment. More concrete, the experiment was 
carried out in two different rooms. In the first room, participants were provided with instruc-
tions stating that they would be taking part in two different studies being carried out by vari-
ous members of the staff. They were told that the first study would be conducted in the first 
room and the second study, which served only as a filler task, would be conducted partly in 
the first room and partly in the second room. The disguise used was that the second study was 
about the effects of a change in environment on how consumers express opinions about prod-
ucts. Further, participants were told that they would be provided with a choice of snacks for 
participating in the study while walking from the first to the second room. A hypothetical 
question was presented in the first study and focused on the health benefits associated with 
the consumption of cake: “If strong evidence emerges from scientific studies suggesting that 
cakes, pastries, etc. are not nearly as bad for your health as they have often been portrayed to 
be, and may have some major health benefits, what would happen to your consumption of 
these items?” Compared to the control group, where respondents had not been asked a hypo-
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thetical question, an increase in the percentage of participants choosing the cake was found 
for the group being exposed to the hypothetical question. Interestingly, these contaminative 
effects of the hypothetical question increased for an increase in cognitive elaboration (manip-
ulated by asking participants to justify their behavior), suggesting a nonconscious mechanism 
(this holds for both the voting and the snack experiment). In addition, a funnel debriefing task 
applied to the snack study supported this nonconscious view. With respect to the issue of 
whether participants believed the hypothetical question affected their subsequent choice, par-
ticipants were asked whether they felt the first study affected their choice. Every participant 
responded negatively. When they were specifically asked “What if I told you that your choice 
was probably influenced by what you did on the first study, what would you say?”, there was 
disbelief, with most participants unwilling to accept the possibility of influence.  
In another example, Mandel and Johnson (2002) found that priming product attributes 
on a web page via background pictures and colors affects product choice, without conscious 
awareness of this effect. In particular, when primed on money using a green welcome page 
with dollars, participants were more likely to choose the cheaper, lower quality product, than 
when primed on the quality feature (i.e., safety for the car example, using a red and orange 
welcome page with flames; comfort for the sofa example, using a blue background with 
clouds). Mandel and Johnson note that
 
their priming manipulation was
 
not subliminal. All of
 
their participants could plainly
 
see the background on
 
the first page, and
 
many recalled the 
wallpaper. An important
 
question was whether or
 





When asked, most participants
 
did not think that
 
the wallpaper influenced their
 
choice.  
Janiszewski (1990, 1993) showed how the allocation of subconscious resources to brand 
names during the processing of ads can influence their evaluation. He concludes that mere 
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exposure to a brand name or product package can encourage a consumer to have a more fa-
vorable attitude toward the brand, even when the consumer cannot recollect the initial expo-
sure.  
Finally, a study by Shapiro, Macinnis and Heckler (1997) extends this research on inci-
dental ad exposure by examining whether incidental exposure to an ad (i.e., the ad receives 
minimal attentional resources while other more relevant information is being processed) in-
creases the likelihood that a product depicted in the ad will be included in a consideration set. 
Inclusion-effects were found despite participants’ lack of explicit memory for the ads.      
II.1.3.B CHARTRAND’S MODEL OF AUTOMATIC PROCESSES WITH A REFERENCE TO CON-
TEXT EFFECTS 
The above examples of nonconscious influences in choice fit within a more general 
framework, the “model of automatic processes” proposed by Chartrand (2005). This model 
contains three phases, each of which may be experienced in a conscious or nonconscious way. 
First, there are the environmental features that trigger an automatic process; second, the pro-
cess itself; and third, there is the outcome. The importance of identifying each of these three 
stages and whether consumers are aware of them or not lies in the fact that control, modifica-
tion, elimination and change can only come with awareness, and each stage requires its own 
mechanism for change. Chartrand (2005) argues that in the consumer behavior domain, where 
the outcome is often a choice between product options, the decision maker is most often 
aware of the outcome—that is, of what he or she chose. However, the consumer may not be 
consiously noting the environmental feature that triggers this outcome (e.g., the background 
music in the store). One of the most frequent scenarios in consumer settings would be one in 
which the consumer is aware of the environmental trigger and the outcome, but not the auto-
matic process. People’s self-insight tends to be limited and their introspective ability flawed 
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(Nisbett and Wilson 1977). The several studies described above are examples of both noncon-
scious processes (i.e., Fitzsimons and Shiv 2001; Mandel and Johnson 2002; Sen and Johnson 
1997) and nonconsciously perceived environmental features (i.e., Janiszewski 1990, 1993; 
Shapiro et al. 1997).  
Research on context effects, previously discussed in terms of its role in activating the 
ease of justification goal, can also be placed within this model of automatic processes. First 
we focus on the automatic process phase, next on the environmental features phase. Simonson 
(1989) has shown that the asymmetric dominance effect becomes stronger when respondents 
are required to justify their results. Fitzsimons et al. (2002) interpret this finding as asymmet-
ric dominance running through a nonconscious process, arguing that had the bias been con-
scious, it would have been expected to moderate under the high processing condition. Shafir, 
Waite and Smith (2002) show that asymmetric dominance effects can be obtained with hon-
eybees and gray jays; these results are also consistent with the idea that asymmetric domi-
nance effects may be more automatic and do not require higher-order cognition for their oc-
curence. An increase in the asymmetric dominance effect was also found by Dhar and Simon-
son (2003) after making available a no-choice option (i.e., the option not to select any alterna-
tive at all in a choice setting) as a way to solve choice conflict (caused by uncertainty about 
the options’ attribute values and consumers’ preferences for those values, especially if the 
options are similar in terms of overall attractiveness). Simonson (2005) argues that consumers 
fail to recognize the impact of the inferior option on their preferences. He states that “the 
asymmetric dominance effect appears to be driven by a rather detailed processing of the op-
tions’ values and the set configuration, even though consumers tend to misattribute their 
choices to tastes, and thus are not aware of the impact of the inferior choice option.” 
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The study by Dhar and Simonson (2003) shows a different picture for the compromise 
effect, another type of relational heuristic (this latter effect is traditionally defined as an in-
crease in the relative choice share of an alternative as it becomes a middle option in the set, 
meaning that its attribute values lie between those of the other alternatives in the set. Suppose 
digital photo camera model T had a score of 5.3 pixels on the resolution attribute, then the 
addition of model D to the set would make model T an intermediate option, causing an in-
crease in its choice share relative to that of model C; Simonson 1989). Making a no-choice 
option available decreases the compromise effect. Thus, although asymmetric dominance and 
compromise are both relational heuristics that depend upon relationships among the available 
options, research suggests that these two heuristics may fundamentally differ in the pro-
cessing that characterizes each. In particular, asymmetric dominance may be more automatic 
and perceptual in nature, whereas compromise may be more controlled and cognitive (Dhar 
and Simonson 2003). This differential view could perhaps be tested using fMRI (i.e., func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging), one of the methods used within the emerging area of 
decision neuroscience. The regions of the brain active during asymmetric dominance choices 
and compromise choices should differ systematically (Kerns et al. 2004; Shiv et al. 2005). In 
particular, as compromise effects will be characterized by more controlled processing, in par-
ticular conflict resolution and cognitive control, more activation of the anterior cingulate cor-
tex, insula, prefrontal cortex, and orbito-frontal cortex is expected for compromise choices 
relative to asymmetric dominance choices. There may be more amygdala activation for 
asymmetric dominance choices relative to compromise choices.   
Dijksterhuis and Smith (2005) take the idea of the asymmetric dominance effect being 
driven by a nonconscious process after a detailed processing of the options values and the set 
configuration even one step further. They argue that conscious awareness of the inferior op-
tion is not even necessary for the context effect to occur. For this, they draw upon an abun-
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dance of social psychological research showing judgmental contrast effects: we find people 
less aggressive after comparing them with Hitler (Herr 1986), or we find ourselves less intel-
ligent after being primed with Einstein (Dijksterhuis et al. 1998). In addition, these effects 
occur even when the comparison stimulus is primed subliminally (Stapel and Blanton 2004).  
As mentioned before, the decision maker is assumed to be aware of the outcome most of 
the time. Bargh et al. (2001), however, show a different picture. Participants were primed or 
not with the goal to be cooperative by using a variation of the scrambled sentence test, includ-
ing words such as dependable, helpful, support, reasonable, honest, cooperative, fair, friendly, 
tolerant, and share in the cooperative condition; and words such as salad, umbrella, city, gaso-
line, wet, purposeful, switch, lead, mountain, and zebra in the control condition. Although 
participants primed with the goal to be cooperative indeed were more cooperative in a re-
source-dilemma task (i.e., a game where participants were asked to fish from a lake with a 
limited number of fish, and had to decide whether they would keep the fish for personal profit 
or would return the fish to the lake to help restock it), they did not report being any more co-
operative than unprimed participants, and their self-reports were uncorrelated with their actual 
behavior. The same was found by Johnston (2002) in a consumer setting: seeing someone eat 
a large quantity of ice cream leads individuals to eat more ice cream themselves. Although 
these people are clearly aware that they are eating ice cream, it has been shown that they are 
not aware of the greater quantity they eat. Thus, even if the average person is normally aware 
of what he or she is doing in a broad sense, the person may still lack meta-awareness of the 
behavioral details (possibly because people do not closely monitor their actions) (Chartrand 
2005; Dijksterhuis and Smith 2005).    
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II.1.3.C MORE EXTREME VIEWS ON THE NONCONSCIOUS DECISION MAKER 
Although certain researchers believe that many (choice) processes must have both non-
conscious and conscious components (e.g., Chartrand 2005; Fitzsimons et al. 2002; Simonson 
2005), others hold a more extreme opinion: “Everything that one encounters is preconsciously 
screened and classified as either good or bad, within a fraction of a second after encountering 
it” (Bargh 1997); “The role of consciousness should not be exaggerated. Rather than actually 
guiding or controlling behavior, consciousness seems mainly to make sense of behavior after 
it is executed” (Loewenstein 2001); and “Conscious processes and consciously considered 
inputs play a relatively minor role in many, perhaps most, judgments, choices and behaviors” 
(Dijksterhuis 2005). Dijksterhuis (2004) even refers to a quote of Freud: “Use consciousness 
for relatively simple and mundane decisions, but refrain from using it too much for more 
complex matters.” This latter notion has been tested by way of an experiment (Dijksterhuis 
2004). Participants were asked to make a choice between four apartments, where one apart-
ment was the most attractive with eight positive, four negative and three neutral attributes, 
while the three remaining apartments were equally attractive and characterized by five posi-
tive, six negative and four neutral attributes. The percentages of participants choosing the at-
tractive apartment were compared for a conscious thought condition (i.e., after being con-
fronted with the apartments, participants were asked to very carefully think about what they 
thought about each of the apartments and were given 3 min. to decide, sitting in front of a 
blank computer screen) and a nonconscious thought condition (i.e., participants were distract-
ed during the 3 min. time period by having to decide for successive digits presented on the 
screen whether they matched the digit that preceded it by two places. This enabled them to 
think unconsciously while at the same time preventing conscious thought). Choice of the at-
tractive apartment turned out to be higher for the nonconscious group. On the basis of these 
findings Dijksterhuis concluded that unconscious thought improves the quality of more com-
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plex decisions. In addition, he argued that this difference in quality was due to conscious 
thought taking only a limited set of the available information into account whereas the uncon-
scious included all (or almost all) information. The selectivity in case of conscious thought 
would be in line with Simon’s (1955) bounded rationality idea. The unconscious however 
would have unlimited resources. An analysis of the number of bits both systems can process 
was given by Dijksterhuis to illustrate this point: consciousness can process 40 to 60 bits per 
second (Nørretranders 1998; Wilson 2002), whereas the capacity of the entire human system 
is about 11,200,000 bits. It has to be noted that, although provocative, Dijksterhuis’ results 
may depend upon the very specific properties of the stimuli and task used, and that his con-
clusions may not generalize to other choice situations.  
In sum, this look at the decision making literature has examined the rational decision 
maker, the decision maker with bounded rationality, the adaptive or constructive decision 
maker, and finally a more unconscious one. The parts that follow draw upon several of the 
ideas, concepts and findings that were described above. More particularly, the concepts of 
bounded rationality, phased decision making and selectivity lead to a first proposition regard-
ing the unacceptable option’s role in the further decision process. A second view is then based 
on the idea of context-dependent preferences, as discussed in the part on reason-based choice, 
and introduces the notion of a nonconscious underlying process. We then note that differential 
processing may characterize the two context effects of asymmetric dominance and compro-
mise (i.e., automatic and perceptual versus controlled and cognitive), as detailed in Char-
trand’s model of automatic processes. These arguments imply that the unacceptable option’s 
role is contingent on how it adds to the final choice context. Furthermore, specific studies 
such as those by Chernev (2004, 2005), Sen and Johnson (1997) and Fitzsimons and Shiv 
(2001) will be useful in the operationalization stage of the dissertation’s research. Before 
looking at this research, we will give detailed definitions of truly unacceptable options and 
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context effects, show how they might be integrated, and subsequently formulate opposing 
hypotheses regarding the unacceptable option’s role in the further decision process. 
II.2 DEFINITION OF UNACCEPTABLE OPTIONS 
Our definition of a “truly unacceptable option” is based on Park’s (1978, 125; 1982, 
154) classification of product dimensions. An unacceptable option is an alternative not satis-
fying a minimum acceptable threshold on a rejection inducing dimension (RID), such that the 
option would be rejected by the decision maker regardless of its other features (e.g., a medi-
um-sized camera will not be bought, even if it has, for example, a high resolution). In addition 
to rejection inducing dimensions, Park also defines trade-off, relative preference and irrele-
vant dimensions, each time decreasing the degree of unacceptability. An alternative character-
ized by the absence of a satisfactory level on a trade-off dimension will be acceptable only if 
it shows an off-setting improvement on another feature (e.g., a camera priced above $350 will 
be unacceptable, unless its bad score on the price dimension is compensated for by another 
important feature such as high resolution). For a relative preference dimension, the alternative 
is acceptable to the decision maker, but the degree of preference is influenced by the differen-
tial threshold of desire defined by the decision maker on this dimension (e.g., good if the 
camera is a Panasonic, and excellent if the camera’s brand is Kodak). Finally, in case of an 
irrelevant dimension, the decision maker is indifferent to the characteristics on the product 
dimension (e.g., the decision maker is indifferent to whether the camera has manual focus or 
not). 
The rejection inducing dimension is introduced in Park’s (1978) research in his phased 
decision model, “the conflict resolution choice model.” This model contains an initial condi-
tional elimination phase, reducing the presented alternatives to a smaller set of acceptable 
brands, and a subsequent satisficing-plus phase, leading to the selection of a single brand from 
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this acceptable set. It was shown that this model outperforms in terms of choice prediction 
single phase models such as the weighted adding model or the lexicographic semi-order mod-
el. In discussing the conflict resolution choice model, Park makes an interesting distinction 
between continuous (e.g., price and gas mileage) and noncontinuous (e.g., two-door versus 
four-door; family versus sports car) product dimensions, thereby suggesting that consumers’ 
rejection rules based on noncontinuous dimensions are more stable. More particularly he 
states the following: “The importance of characterizing a stimulus as continuous or noncon-
tinuous lies in the fact that for many noncontinuous variables an individual can reliably cate-
gorize an object as belonging to a class of objects (e.g., two-door cars). An objective external 
standard of reference is often present in the case of noncontinuous product dimensions which 
allows the individual to discriminate between categories more clearly. This may not be true in 
the case of continuous product dimensions. A relatively high degree of stimulus ambiguity is 
expected in the cognitive categorization of continuous product dimensions, since an objective 
standard of reference is often not available. Therefore, categorization on these product dimen-
sions is not as straightforward as for noncontinuous product dimensions. This does not mean 
that the continuous product dimension is not cognitively categorized (e.g., gas mileage could 
be categorized by breaking it into ranges; unacceptable if below 15, acceptable if between 15 
and 20, excellent if above 20). However, this categorization may be unstable; it may change 
during the choice process.”  
Illustrations of how categorization may change during the choice process go in two di-
rections. First, individuals may readjust the cognitive categories of price or gas mileage to 
facilitate a final choice when the alternatives are not satisfactorily distinguishable based upon 
the initial categories of the continuous product dimensions and information about the other 
product dimensions. The study shows that nine participants (of 58) distinguished the first 
choice from the second based solely upon price differences that they viewed initially as be-
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longing to the same categories. In addition, four participants made a final choice based solely 
upon gas mileage differences initially viewed as belonging to the same categories. Second, 
and perhaps more interesting, individuals may include in their evoked set alternatives initially 
marked as containing truly unacceptable levels, and this trend may be larger for continuous 
compared to noncontinuous attributes. Park reports that 22 participants (of 58) included in 
their evoked set at least one brand for which the dimensions were below minimum levels on 
the RIDs. Fifteen of these 22 participants included in their evoked set brands which possessed 
unacceptable scores on the continuous product dimensions price and gas mileage. For exam-
ple, if the participant indicated “gas mileage ≥ 25” as a minimum cutoff level, a brand with 23 
mpg. should certainly be rejected. However, this brand might have been included in the 
evoked set if information on the other product dimensions could compensate for the “unac-
ceptable” 23 mpg. Seven participants included in their evoked set brands which possessed 
unacceptable categories on noncontinuous product dimensions.  
Park also included the rejection inducing dimension in his development of a “decision 
plan net” (defined by Park et al. (1981) as “a decision maker’s detailed sketch about intended 
strategies toward future decision situations”; figure 4 shows a concrete example of a decision 
plan net for a person who wants to buy a house). Park applied the decision plan net both to 
individual buying behavior to verify whether the outcome of the decision plan was in line 
with the actual choice made (Park et al. 1981) and also to family decision making (Park 
1982).  
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Figure 4: An example of a decision plan net 
 
Source: Park, C. Whan (1982), “Joint Decisions in Home Purchasing: A Muddling-Through Process,” 
Journal of Consumer Research, 9 (September), 153. 
 
A definition of a truly unacceptable option similar to that of Park (1978, 1982) was giv-
en by Klein (1987, 155): an attribute level is checked as unacceptable if it is so disliked that 
“if a product has it, you would immediately reject it as an alternative, no matter what else it 
has to offer.” The strongest of several formulations of an unacceptable level listed by Metha, 
Moore and Pavia (1992) and by Green, Krieger and Bansal (1988) also coincides with Park’s 
definition of a rejection inducing dimension. These studies all have in common that they look 
at the unacceptable option in relation to conjoint analysis. The Adaptive Conjoint Analysis’ 
interactive nature allows the respondent to indicate whether any levels within an attribute are 
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“completely unacceptable” in the sense that no matter how attractive an alternative might be 
on other attributes, the respondent would reject the alternative if it contained any completely 
unacceptable attribute level (Green et al. 1988). This has the advantage of being able to con-
fine questions to acceptable levels, as such reducing the number of questions posed, tailoring 
the interview to the individual, making it more interesting, and allowing for more efficient 
estimation of the remaining levels (Metha et al. 1992). One has to be cautious, however, as a 
misspecification of utility models may occur if respondents do not behave in line with these 
unacceptability judgments. Studies have indeed shown that the first choice of some respond-
ents may contain an unacceptable level of an attribute: “on average, the completely unac-
ceptable level is chosen 14.8% of the time” (Green et al. 1988) and “in 11% of the decisions 
respondents choose an alternative with an unacceptable level even though there were accepta-
ble alternatives in the choice set” (Klein 1987). To explain this discrepancy between judgment 
and choice Klein argues that unacceptability is likely to be context-dependent, rather than an 
inherent characteristic of an attribute level. She wonders how strongly noncompensatory deci-
sion strategies reflect judgments made prior to the choice, as opposed to dynamic responses to 
a particular choice context that is encountered. That choice environment matters is shown in a 
study by Huber and Klein (1991). They examined the effects of attribute correlation and relia-
bility of the information about the attribute on the severity of cutoffs, and in general found 
that positive correlations between attributes (compared to negative ones) and more reliable 
sources caused more severe cutoffs (meaning that fewer attribute levels were acceptable).  
In the literature the concepts sacred values (Tetlock 1992; Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 
1996), protected values (Baron and Spancra 1997), and taboo trade-offs (Tetlock et al. 2000) 
are used to refer to attributes that resist trade-offs with other attribute levels, thus leading to 
judgments of unacceptability. Examples include life, justice, liberty, honor, love, nature, and 
human rights. In the current dissertation we do not restrict the concept of the truly unaccepta-
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ble level to that of a sacred or protected value. As mentioned by Luce, Bettman and Payne 
(2000) the class of attributes with links to moral rules is likely to represent a mere subset of 
the attributes that decision makers value. Furthermore, Baron and Spancra (1997) state that it 
should be possible to find nonmoral values that are also protected (in the sense of resisting 
tradeoffs). Thus, the studies presented hereafter will denote any attribute level, with moral 
inclination or not, that complies with Park’s definition of a rejection inducing dimension as 
truly unacceptable.  
II.3 DEFINITION OF CONTEXT EFFECTS AND THEIR INTE-
GRATION WITH UNACCEPTABLE OPTIONS 
The central question addressed by the current dissertation is whether information pro-
vided by an unacceptable option plays a role in the decision process by altering the choice 
context and thus affecting the final choice. As such, the current work draws upon a well-
known phenomenon called “context effects on choice”, which is defined by Ratneshwar, 
Shocker and Stewart (1987) as “a change in the choice process or in its results as a function of 
the particular composition of the choice set.” Shafir et al. (2002) add to this that choice does 
not merely reflect the subjective evaluation of independent attributes of options, but is influ-
enced by the characteristics of the other options that are being compared.  
Context effects typically have been studied by comparing people’s preferences between 
two options (a target T and competitor C defined on only two attributes and lying on the same 
equi-preference contour; figure 5) when presented alone and when presented along with a 
third alternative (decoy D or D’) (Huber et al. 1982; Huber and Puto 1983; Shafir et al. 1993; 
Simonson 1989; Simonson and Tversky 1992; Tversky and Simonson 1993). The relative 
preference for the target relative to the competitor is equal to the proportion of choice of T 
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divided by the sum of the proportion of choice of T and the proportion of choice of C (Shafir 
et al. 2002).  
More concretely, we consider the impact of unacceptable options on choice sets where 
that unacceptable option is either asymmetrically dominated (Huber et al. 1982; Huber and 
Puto 1983) or is an extreme option in a compromise situation (Simonson and Tversky 1992). 
For example, we ask whether giving information that an asymmetrically dominated decoy has 
a fatal flaw decreases or leaves unchanged the context effect. This result is theoretically im-
portant, since asymmetric dominance and compromise rely on the relative values in the set, 
whereas a truly unacceptable feature might exclude an alternative regardless of the other val-
ues.  
Next, we define the standard context effects of asymmetric dominance and compromise. 
An asymmetric dominance effect occurs if the choice share of the target relative to the com-
petitor is enhanced when a third option (D), which is asymmetrically dominated, is added to 
the set. Asymmetrically dominated means that D is dominated by at least one alternative in 
the set (T) but is not dominated by at least one other (C), with dominated meaning that an 
option scores worse on at least one attribute and is equivalent or inferior on all other attributes 
(figure 5; Huber et al. 1982). The asymmetric dominance effect is a robust finding. Although 
a majority of the demonstrations of this effect have been in the context of consumer decision 
making, in product classes ranging from cars and restaurants to light bulbs and paper towel 
(Heath and Chatterjee 1995; Huber et al. 1982; Lehmann and Pan 1994), results from contexts 
such as job candidate choice (Highhouse 1996), electoral candidate choice (Pan, O’Curry, and 
Pitts 1995) and gambles (Wedell 1991) also provide evidence of this effect. Even honeybees 
and gray jays show the asymmetric dominance effect (Shafir et al. 2002). From a methodolog-
ical point of view, the effect has been tested between-subjects (Huber and Puto 1983; Huber 
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et al. 1982; Ratneshwar et al. 1987; Simonson 1989; Wedell 1991) as well as within-subjects 
(Lehmann and Pan 1994; Pan and Lehmann 1993; Wedell 1993), and measured based on 
choice (Heath et al. 2000) as well as ratings (e.g., an attractiveness rating using a nine-point 
scale with anchor points: 1 = “not at all attractive”, through 9 = “very attractive”; Pettibone 
and Wedell 2000) and points data (i.e., the division of 100 points among the options based on 
their relative liking for each one; Sen 1998).  
The compromise effect occurs if the relative choice share of the target is enhanced when 
a third option (D’), which makes the target a compromise option, is added to the set (figure 5). 
A compromise option is defined here as a middle option, meaning that its attribute values are 
between the values of the other alternatives (Chernev 2004; Simonson 1989; Simonson and 
Tversky 1992).  
Figure 5: Defining context effects - Asymmetric dominance and compromise 
 
Note. C = competitor; T = target; D = asymmetric dominance decoy; D’ = compromise decoy. 
 
As mentioned before, the question we address is whether a decoy (D or D’) with a truly 
unacceptable additional feature produces the same context effects. The option’s truly unac-
ceptable feature is defined by adding a third categorical attribute, taking two possible values, 
present or absent, with one of these values being truly unacceptable. For example, a product 
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may not have a CE label (Conformité Européene). A product without this label may be un-
healthy or dangerous for the environment, and purchasing it would be illegal in the EU. Alt-
hough consumers’ rejection rules based on continuous attributes may change during the 
choice process, categorical thresholds have been found to be more stable (Park 1978).   
Thus, two continuous attributes determine the context relationship among the three op-
tions, while the third categorical attribute defines the decoy’s unacceptability. This contrast 
can be seen in the two choice sets in figure 6, the one on the left containing the standard 
asymmetrically dominated alternative and the one on the right showing the decoy becoming 
unacceptable because it lacks the CE label. In this way, it is possible to make the decoy an 
acceptable (CE label: “Yes”) versus unacceptable (CE label: “No”) option without changing 
the context relationship present in the set (appendix 2). In addition, making unacceptability 
independent of the context-defining attributes theoretically makes it possible for decision 
makers to never notice the context-defining attribute levels if they reject an unacceptable op-
tion based on the third categorical attribute.  
Figure 6: Illustrating the manipulation of unacceptable levels 
 
Note. C = competitor; T = target; D = asymmetric dominance decoy. 
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II.4 ARGUMENTS CONTRA VERSUS PRO THE EFFECT OF A 
TRULY UNACCEPTABLE OPTION ON SUBSEQUENT CHOICE 
 Arguments can be made to support either no effect of having an unacceptable decoy or 
that an unacceptable decoy will affect choices. Based upon notions of bounded rationality 
(Simon 1955), decision makers may resort to phased choice processing when presented with 
an alternative containing an unacceptable attribute level in order to save effort (Payne 1976). 
A typical phased strategy would contain an initial phase (i.e., an editing phase) in which some 
alternatives are eliminated after considering only a small portion of the available information 
(Bettman et al. 1998; Payne 1976), followed by a choice phase. Thus, if information that an 
option is unacceptable leads to its immediate elimination in this initial editing phase, that will 
limit any impact of that alternative (and the information it contains) on the final choice, lead-
ing to the following hypothesis: 
H1a:  A truly unacceptable decoy option (and the information it contains) will have 
no impact on the subsequent choice phase and final choice of the best option. 
Thus an unacceptable decoy will nullify standard asymmetric dominance and 
compromise context effects. 
Alternatively, arguments can be made that an unacceptable option may have an effect on 
choice. Individuals, even if editing out or rejecting an option, may briefly examine the other 
contributing attribute values for that option in addition to considering the categorical attribute 
(perhaps out of some sort of curiosity or even nonconsciously). This consideration might pave 
the way for the unacceptable option to help define the context within which the other options 
are perceived and therefore preference among alternatives (e.g., Huber et al. 1982; Simonson 
and Tversky 1992). Thus, the context of the choice set may be partially determined by such 
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“contaminated” perceptions (Wilson and Brekke 1994, 1193) regarding how the unacceptable 
option’s continuous attribute levels define the relationships among the choice options. Such 
contamination is difficult to detect by the individual; decision makers are often quite good at 
recognizing the outcome of a process, but they are not nearly as good at determining the vari-
ous contributors to that outcome (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wilson et al. 1989). The fact that 
the process of contamination is unobservable might not be that bothersome if contamination 
had observable symptoms, which is unfortunately seldom the case. “Human judgments—even 
very bad ones—do not smell (Wilson and Brekke 1994).” This difficulty of detecting contam-
ination makes it hard to eliminate, for the simple reason that if people are unaware that their 
judgment is biased, they will not try to debias it (Wilson and Brekke 1994).  
The idea that debiasing might not be that simple is also found in the article by Houghton 
et al. (1999): “One difficulty in applying debiasing approaches is that consumers typically 
operate (in real life) in a between-subjects design. Consequently, the decision errors cannot be 
easily observed by an individual consumer. Furthermore, many of those choice phenomena 
may operate through perceptual processes that are unconscious.” Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
also point to the importance of people’s not being aware of the influence of certain stimuli for 
some set of psychological phenomena to take place. If people were aware of the effects, they 
would surely strive to counteract that influence, and would therefore not show the typical ef-
fect. They list several examples of such psychological phenomena, two of which are mechan-
ics of judgment (e.g., contrast effects) and certain context effects.  
                                                 
 
3
 Wilson and Brekke define mental contamination as “the process whereby a person ends with an unwanted 
judgment, emotion or behavior because of mental processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable, with unwant-
ed meaning that the judgment maker would prefer not to be influenced by the mental process in question.”  
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The two choice phenomena we consider, asymmetric dominance and compromise, also 
make correction for such influences of the unacceptable option unlikely, although for different 
reasons. Asymmetric dominance is thought to be perceptual in nature and thus more automat-
ic—the consumer thinks the target is chosen because of its better score on an attribute that is 
important to him, thus based on the consumer’s underlying preferences and not on the op-
tion’s dominating position (Dhar and Simonson 2003). As a result, individuals may not cor-
rect for the context-defining effect of the unacceptable option due to lack of awareness of be-
ing biased. Compromise, however, is seen as a more conscious process with the consumer 
choosing the target option because of its middle position. Because this is perceived by the 
consumer as a way to resolve preference in the face of conflicts regarding attribute tradeoffs 
(Dhar and Simonson 2003) and thus facilitates the decision making process (Novemsky et al. 
2004), the consumer may not correct for any influence of the unacceptable option. That is, 
people might recognize the power of the influences but be perfectly willing to be affected by 
them (Wilson and Brekke 1994).  
The above discussion, based on context-dependent preferences, contamination, and lack 
of correction, leads to the following alternative hypothesis: 
H1b:  A truly unacceptable decoy option (and the information it contains) will have 
an impact on the subsequent choice phase and final choice of the best option. 
Thus an unacceptable decoy will not nullify known context effects. 
An empirical test of whether the presence of a truly unacceptable option in the set af-
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CHAPTER III :  
RESEARCH 
III.1 STUDY 1: THE TRULY UNACCEPTABLE OPTION AND 
THE FINAL CHOICE MADE 
This first study examines whether the presence of a truly unacceptable option in the set 
affects subsequent choice (does not nullify context effects, hypothesis 1b) or does not (nulli-
fies context effects, hypothesis 1a). 
III.1.1 METHOD 
Participants. A total of 268 European university students participated in this study. Five 
of them were eliminated because of incomplete or cursory survey completion. The survey was 
administered in a consumer lab on a computer and took about 15 to 20 min. to complete. In 
return for their cooperation, the participants received a cinema ticket.  
Task and Design. Choices were made in each of 11 product categories: CD player, corn-
flakes, restaurant, paper towel, digital photo camera, student room, portable PC, potato chips, 
overnight accommodation, printer paper and microwave oven. Five different types of choice 
sets were used within each of the 11 categories: a two-option choice set containing a target 
and a competitor (type 1); a three-option set with asymmetric dominance due to an acceptable 
decoy (type 2); a three-option set with asymmetric dominance due to an unacceptable decoy 
(type 3); a three-option set with compromise due to an acceptable decoy (type 4); and a three-
option set with compromise due to an unacceptable decoy (type 5) (figure 7). In each of these 
sets, the target and the competitor always had an acceptable level for the categorical attribute. 
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Because we need to compare choice shares for several types of choice sets within the same 
category (e.g., digital photo camera, two-option set versus digital photo camera, three-option 
set with compromise due to an unacceptable decoy), we used the same sequence of categories 
for all these types of choice sets. Participants were divided into five different groups, and each 
participant made choices from only one type of choice set for any given product category. 
However, to provide variety and greater engagement in participants’ choices, each participant 
made choices of all five types, rotated across product categories by group in an approximately 
balanced way. That is, participants in group 1 chose from choice sets of type 1 for product 
category 1 (CD player), choice sets of type 2 for product category 2 (cornflakes), etc.; partici-
pants in group 2 chose from choice sets of type 2 for product category 1, sets of type 3 for 
category 2, etc.; and participants in group 5 chose from sets of type 5 for category 1, sets of 
type 1 for category 2, etc. With five types of choice sets across 11 categories perfect balance 
was not possible, but the design ensured that each participant experienced each choice type at 
least twice.  
To verify whether classical context effects hold, we first compare selections in the two-
option choice set containing a target and a competitor and the three-option set with asymmet-
ric dominance/compromise due to an acceptable decoy. Comparing the two-option set and the 
three-option set with asymmetric dominance/compromise due to an unacceptable decoy made 
it possible to check for the existence of context effects even in the presence of an option with 
a truly unacceptable feature. Examining the three-option set with asymmetric domi-
nance/compromise due to an acceptable decoy versus an unacceptable decoy gave additional 
insight into the relative magnitude of context effects when adding an acceptable versus an 
unacceptable alternative to the set. Both asymmetric dominance and compromise were used in 
order to be able to generalize the findings.  
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Operationalization. The selection of the labels, operationalizing the categorical attrib-
utes and the choice of corresponding product categories was based partially on some labels 
found in the real world and on product categories found in articles on context effects (e.g., 
Heath and Chatterjee 1995; Lehmann and Pan 1994). Furthermore, both labels and categories 
were chosen to be meaningful to a European student population. The CE label (Conformité 
Européene) is used for CD player, digital photo camera, portable PC and microwave oven. 
Buying a product without a CE label in the EU is illegal and signifies it may be unhealthy or 
unsafe or dangerous for the environment. The GMI label was used for cornflakes and potato 
chips. GMI means the product contains genetically modified ingredients, a major issue for 
European consumers. The EU flower label was used for paper towels and printer paper. This 
label signifies that the product was made in an environmentally responsible way. A cleanli-
ness label was used for restaurant and overnight accommodations, with lack of such a label 
indicating problems with cleanliness. Finally, a fire safety label was used for student rooms, 
with lack of the label indicating problems with fire safety. The CE label, the GMI label and 
the EU flower label are existing labels in the EU, whereas the cleanliness label and the fire 
safety label were invented labels. Appendix 1 lists a description of the labels, including their 
symbols, as used in the questionnaire. 
To ensure that levels of the continuous attributes were realistic, we consulted Consumer 
Reports, websites selling the product categories used, and producers’ websites. We adjusted 
levels to make sure that the percentage of the market range covered by the target and the 
competitor’s attribute levels was about 17% for both continuous attributes within a particular 
category. This controls for differences in choice due to differing ranges of the attributes’ lev-
els in the set and thus the relative importance of the attributes. The continuous attributes and 
their levels for each of the 11 product categories, and for both context types are shown in ap-
pendix 4.  
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A pretest preceded this study, with two purposes: (1) to find labels that, in combination 
with specific product categories, produce a sufficiently high percentage of participants denot-
ing the label as truly unacceptable and (2) to search for appropriate product category, continu-
ous attribute, and attribute level combinations that ensure roughly equal preference (i.e., a 
50/50 distribution) for both target and competitor in the two-alternative condition. Following 
these pretests, some changes were made to ensure that stimuli best met the criteria above.  
The pretest on the label was completed by 225 university students. Six labels (combined 
with 11 categories) were checked, and five of them were retained (table 1). The room quality 
label was skipped in favor of the fire safety label (both linked to the student room), as it ob-
tained a lower unacceptability percentage. In addition, to make sure that the label was not 
indicated as being truly unacceptable just because of the order in which it appeared in the 
questionnaire (see procedure for details on unacceptability measurement), a possible order 
effect was checked for but not found. 
Table 1: Percentage “truly unacceptable”, per label, per product category – Pre-test 
results 
Perceived as truly unacceptable (%) 
























































Note. Sample sizes reported in parentheses under percentage “truly unacceptable”.  
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The pretest on equal preference was completed by 472 university students. For certain 
categories up to five rounds of testing, with several alterations of attributes and/or attribute 
levels, were necessary before obtaining a satisfying distribution (table 2). We checked for a 
possible effect of the position of the option in the productXattribute matrix (first versus last), 
but no such effect was found.  
Table 2: Relative choice share T/(T+C) for the two-option set, for each of the 11 prod-
uct categories – Pre-test results 
Choice share of target relative to competitor (%) 
Product category CD player Digital camera PC Microwave Cornflakes Potato chips 
Nr of rounds 2 2 3 2 5 4 

















Nr of rounds 2 3 3 2 5  












Note. Sample sizes reported in parentheses under relative choice shares.  
 
Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine making a choice in a category and then 
received information (description and market range, if applicable) on the two continuous at-
tributes and one categorical label. They were told that other attributes, including price, were 
identical for the different options (Huber and Puto 1983; Ratneshwar et al. 1987; Simonson 
1989). After processing this information, the participant was asked to make a choice from a 
set of either two or three options, depending upon which of the five choice set conditions he 
or she was in, presented in a productXattribute matrix. The competitor was the first product 
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listed, followed by the target, and the decoy, if present, was listed in last position. The partici-
pant then repeated this process for the remaining 10 product categories, with type of choice 
set rotated across categories as described above.  
After all choices were completed, participants assessed the label’s unacceptability for 
the three-option unacceptable decoy sets presented to them. Using Park’s (1978, 1982) classi-
fication of product dimensions, participants characterized the label as falling into one of the 
following four categories: truly unacceptable; acceptable, but it had to be offset by another 
feature; acceptable, but influenced the degree of preference in a negative way; and irrelevant 
to my choice (appendix 3). The productXattribute matrix, indicating the participant’s earlier 
choice in an extra column, and the label’s definition were shown to the participant again prior 
to this unacceptability assessment. 
Appendix 5 contains screenshots for each of the steps described above (i.e., description 
of the attributes, choice matrix, unacceptability assessment), as used in the Dutch question-
naire. 
III.1.2 RESULTS 
The percentage “truly unacceptable” is given in table 3 for each label-product category 
combination. Note that the GMI label is unexpectedly low in the degree to which it yields 
unacceptable options in this study. The second column of table 4, titled “two-option set, no 
decoy” shows that the choice distribution between the target and the competitor is relatively 
close to 50/50 for each of the 11 categories.  
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Table 3: Percentage “truly unacceptable”, per label, per product category – Experi-
mental results 
Perceived as truly unacceptable (%) 
























































Note. Sample sizes reported in parentheses under percentage “truly unacceptable”.  
 
Table 4 presents the choice share of the target relative to the competitor for the different 
choice set types for each of the 11 product categories and overall. To examine hypotheses 1a 
and 1b, we carry out the following comparisons for both the asymmetric dominance and the 
compromise sets: no decoy – acceptable decoy, no decoy – unacceptable decoy, and accepta-
ble decoy – unacceptable decoy. The results can be summarized by examining the overall 
percentages in table 4. 
First we see that relative to the two-option set, adding an asymmetrically dominated de-
coy increases the relative share of the target from 50.6% to 71.5%. Similarly, making the tar-
get the compromise increases its share to 69.6%. These results replicate the classic asymmet-
ric dominance and compromise effects. Next, we examine the same contrasts for cases where 
the decoy is designated as unacceptable by the decision maker. There we see that the asym-
metric dominance target share has smaller gain to 66.7% and compromise shows a gain to 
65%. Thus it appears that making the decoy unacceptable slightly decreases the context effect, 
but does not eliminate it.   
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Table 4: Relative choice share T/(T+C) for the different choice set types, for each of the 
11 product categories and overall 
Choice share of target relative to competitor (%) 
Product category Two-option set, 
no decoy 




































































































































Note. Sample sizes reported in parentheses under relative choice shares.  
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Appropriate statistical tests are based on logistic regression, run separately for asymmet-
ric dominance and compromise. First we test the significance of the standard decoy effects 
and then whether making the decoy unacceptable further affects choice. 
Context Effects with an Acceptable Decoy. We first check for replication of standard 
asymmetric dominance and compromise effects by focusing on the two-option, no decoy and 
the three-option, acceptable decoy sets. If context effects are not found for the unacceptable 
decoy, this needs to be attributed to the unacceptable option, not to the possibility that the 
experimental stimuli might not have been capable of inducing context effects.  
The following logistic regression model is used for our tests: 
 
with “decoy type” defined as acceptable decoy compared with no decoy at all and “product 
category” as CD player, cornflakes, etc.  
Including the interaction term makes it possible to check whether the product category 
acts as a moderator of the preference-decoy type relationship. This same model is used for all 
further comparisons made within the present experiment; only the decoy type will be differ-
ently defined each time.  
The results indicate that the product category is not a moderator for asymmetric domi-
nance (χ2(21) = 97.87, pinteraction term > .10), but it is a moderator for compromise (χ
2
(21) = 
104.52, pinteraction term < .05). With regard to the latter, the categories paper towel and micro-
wave oven show different effects compared to the other product categories: paper towel 
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shows a very large increase in preference for the target relative to the competitor when an 
acceptable decoy is added to the set, whereas microwave oven shows a very small increase.  
We replicate standard context effects. Acceptable decoys influence relative preference 
(χ2asymmetric dominance (21) = 97.87, χ
2
compromise (21) = 104.52, pdecoy type term < .001 for both asym-
metric dominance and compromise), and these effects are positive (basymmetric dominance = .983, 
bcompromise = .947), showing that the addition of an acceptable decoy to the choice set signifi-
cantly increases the choice share of the target relative to the competitor
4
.  
Because of the relatively small sample sizes and the aim of the current study to general-
ize the findings, and thus not to restrict the findings to a single category, the statistical proce-
dure as proposed and applied by Huber and Puto (1983) is used in the current study. This pro-
cedure uses the Fisher Exact Test (Siegel 1956) to test the null model, that coincides with the 
assumption of proportionality
5
, within each product class. The probability values for these 
tests are then aggregated across classes by assigning a chi-square value that corresponds to the 
probability of the data given the null model (χ2(2) = -2 ln p). Since the product classes reflect 
decisions on different items using very different dimensions, it is reasonable to assume that 
the resulting test statistics are independent. An aggregate test is then formed by using the ad-
ditivity property of independent chi-square statistics. Table 5 below lists the complete p-
                                                 
 
4
 The above analysis is based on deviation coding for the product category variable. The results for the simple 
model containing only the decoy type as an independent variable are as follows: 
… Acceptable decoys influence relative preference (χ2asymmetric dominance (1) = 52.68, χ
2
compromise (1) = 39.99, pdecoy 
type term < .001 for both asymmetric dominance and compromise), and these effects are positive (basymmetric dominance 
= .895, bcompromise = .805). 
5
 Assumption of proportionality: the new item takes share from existing items in proportion to their original 
shares. Thus, no influence of the added item on the relative choice share T/(T+C), and as such no context effect, 
is assumed. 
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values and associated chi-square statistics for the several product categories and the aggregate 
test for both context types (i.e., asymmetric dominance and compromise).  
Identical results in terms of significance are found (asymmetric dominance: χ2(22) = 
91.4, p < .001; compromise: χ2(22) = 88.9, p < .001) compared to the logistic regression find-
ings. 
Table 5: Acceptable decoy versus no decoy - Fisher Exact Test per category and ag-
gregated chi-square statistics 
 Asymmetric dominance Compromise 
Product category p (Directional Fisher Exact Test) χ
2
(2) = -2*ln(p) p (Directional Fisher Exact Test) χ
2
(2) = -2*ln(p) 
CD player .077 5.1 .078 5.1 
Digital camera .018 8.0 0.0001 18.4 
Portable PC .015 8.4 .08 5.1 
Microwave .018 8.0 .565 1.1 
Cornflakes .057 5.7 .322 2.3 
Potato chips .187 3.4 .239 2.9 
Restaurant .004 11.0 .002 12.4 
Overnight accommodation .208 3.1 .015 8.4 
Student room .021 7.7 .149 3.8 
Paper towel 0.0001 18.4 0.0001 18.4 





(22) = 91.4, p < .001;  
Critical χ
2
 value for (α = .001) = 48.27 
χ
2
(22) = 88.9, p < .001;  
Critical χ
2
 value for (α = .001) = 48.27 
 
Context Effects with an Unacceptable Decoy. Next, we check whether hypothesis 1a or 
hypothesis 1b holds. In particular, we examine whether the truly unacceptable option and the 
information it contains is eliminated in an initial editing phase and thus does not influence the 
subsequent choice phase (hypothesis 1a), or whether the information characterizing the unac-
ceptable still plays a role in the further decision process by helping to define the context with-
in which the final choice is made (hypothesis 1b).  
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We applied the same statistical procedure as above, except that the logistic model’s de-
coy type is now defined as unacceptable decoy versus no decoy at all, where the unacceptabil-
ity evaluation of the label is used to restrict the analysis to only those participants rating the 
label as truly unacceptable (roughly 55% of the participants overall; table 3). 
For both asymmetric dominance and compromise, the product category doesn’t signifi-
cantly moderate the preference-decoy type relationship (χ2asymmetric dominance (21) = 52.6, 
χ2compromise (21) = 61.95, pinteraction term > .10). For both context settings, unacceptable decoys 
influence relative preference (χ2asymmetric dominance (21) = 52.6, χ
2
compromise (21) = 61.95, pdecoy type 
term < .001) with a positive b-coefficient (asymmetric dominance = .850, compromise = .650)
6
. 
Thus, even though the decoy is considered to be truly unacceptable by respondents, its addi-
tion to the choice set still increases the choice share of the target relative to the competitor, 
resulting in an asymmetric dominance/compromise effect. These findings support hypothesis 
1b: the unacceptable option influences the subsequent choice phase by helping to define the 
context within which the final choice is made. The fact that the influence of the unacceptable 
is found in both the asymmetric dominance and the compromise setting strengthens this con-
clusion.  
Identical results in terms of significance are found when applying the Fisher Exact Test 
in combination with chi-square statistics (asymmetric dominance: χ2(22) = 52.4, p < .001; 
compromise: χ2(22) = 46.7, p < .01).  
                                                 
 
6
 The above analysis is based on deviation coding for the product category variable. The results for the simple 
model containing only the decoy type as an independent variable are as follows: 
… For both context settings, unacceptable decoys influence relative preference (χ2asymmetric dominance (1) = 21.15, 
χ2compromise (1) = 17.65, pdecoy type term < .001) with a positive b-coefficient (asymmetric dominance = .669, com-
promise = .596) 
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Table 6: Unacceptable decoy versus no decoy - Fisher Exact Test per category and 
aggregated chi-square statistics 
 Asymmetric dominance Compromise 
Product category p (Directional Fisher Exact Test) χ
2
(2) = -2*ln(p) p (Directional Fisher Exact Test) χ
2
(2) = -2*ln(p) 
CD player .201 3.2 .325 2.2 
Digital camera .584 1.1 .097 4.7 
Portable PC .056 5.8 .035 6.7 
Microwave .132 4.0 .029 7.1 
Cornflakes .122 4.2 .411 1.8 
Potato chips .004 11.0 .441 1.6 
Restaurant .019 7.9 .324 2.3 
Overnight accommodation .308 2.4 .354 2.1 
Student room .181 3.4 .496
7
 1.4 
Paper towel .038 6.5 .054 5.8 





(22) = 52.4, p < .001;  
Critical χ
2
 value for (α = .001) = 48.27 
χ
2
(22) = 46.7, p < .01;  
Critical χ
2
 value for (α = .01) = 40.29 
 
Comparing the Unacceptable and the Acceptable Decoy Case. Finally, we compare the 
relative magnitude of the effect of the acceptable decoy and the unacceptable decoy, testing 
the significance of the mean decrease in the magnitude of the effect due to the unacceptable 
nature of the decoy, namely a 4.8% drop for the asymmetric dominance case and a 4.6% drop 
for the compromise case.  
We ran a logistic regression analysis contrasting decoy type defined as unacceptable de-
coy versus acceptable decoy, using only participants rating the label as truly unacceptable in 
the unacceptable decoy setting. In this analysis, the product category doesn’t act as a modera-
tor (χ2asymmetric dominance (21) = 52.95, χ
2
compromise (21) = 84.86, pinteraction term ≥ .10). More im-
portant, the decoy type term is not significant for either asymmetric dominance (pdecoy type term > 
                                                 
 
7
 1-p is listed as the addition of the unacceptable decoy decreased the relative choice share T/(T+C) for the stu-
dent room category. 
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.10) or compromise (pdecoy type term = .105 > .10)
8
. Thus, whether the decoy is acceptable or un-
acceptable, the preference for the target relative to the competitor is not significantly changed. 
This further supports the importance of the role of the truly unacceptable option. 
Applying the Fisher Exact Test in combination with chi-square statistics shows a some-
what different picture: for compromise the relative preference drops significantly when the 
decoy is considered to be truly unacceptable by respondents (asymmetric dominance: χ2(22) = 
26.8, p > .10; compromise: χ2(22) = 35, p < .05).  
                                                 
 
8
 The above analysis is based on deviation coding for the product category variable. The results for the simple 
model containing only the decoy type as the independent variable are as follows: 
… More important, the decoy type term is not significant for either asymmetric dominance or compromise 
(χ2asymmetric dominance (1) = 2.14, χ
2
compromise (1) = 1.88, pdecoy type term > .10). 
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Table 7: Unacceptable decoy versus acceptable decoy - Fisher Exact Test per catego-
ry and aggregated chi-square statistics 
 Asymmetric dominance Compromise 
Product category p (Directional Fisher Exact Test) χ
2
(2) = -2*ln(p) p (Directional Fisher Exact Test) χ
2
(2) = -2*ln(p) 
CD player .455 1.6 0.284 2.5 
Digital camera .029 7.1 0.059 5.7 
Portable PC .442 1.6 0.604 1.0 
Microwave .292 2.5 0.965 0.1 
Cornflakes .573
9
 1.1 0.407 1.8 
Potato chips .978 0.0 0.373 2.0 
Restaurant .563 1.1 0.027 7.2 
Overnight accommodation .571 1.1 0.083 5 
Student room .225 3.0 0.127 4.1 
Paper towel .151 3.8 0.124 4.2 





(22) = 26.8, p > .10;  
Critical χ
2
 value for (α = .10) = 30.81 
χ
2
(22) = 35, p < .05;  
Critical χ
2
 value for (α = .05) = 33.92 
III.1.3 DISCUSSION 
The findings of this first study indicate that editing is rarely as surgical as has been as-
sumed. The presence of a truly unacceptable option in the set biases the consumer’s final 
choice by altering the perceived context within which this final choice is made. Put different-
ly, making the decoy unacceptable has minimal impact on standard asymmetric dominance or 
compromise effects. Thus, it appears that unacceptability does not significantly limit the op-
tion’s contextual impact. The Fisher Exact Test results indicate that the conclusion might be 
less clear-cut for the compromise case: there is still an effect of the unacceptable decoy on 
final choice, but it is reduced in magnitude when compared to the acceptable decoy’s influ-
                                                 
 
9
 1-p is listed as the relative choice share T/(T+C) is higher for the unacceptable decoy compared to the accepta-
ble decoy case. And this is true for the categories cornflakes and potato chips in case of asymmetric dominance, 
and for the categories portable PC, microwave, cornflakes, potato chips and printer paper in case of compromise. 
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ence. Next we examine whether additional focus on unacceptability can alter these conclu-
sions.  
Additional focus on the unacceptable status of an option could change the influence of 
that option on final choice through an attentional or a correction mechanism. Attentionally, 
any increase in the attributes of the unacceptable alternative could lead to greater contextual 
influence. More likely, we hypothesize that this same attention could stimulate mechanisms 
for correcting for mental contamination. Correction mechanisms mentioned by Wilson and 
Brekke (1994) include trying to increase awareness of bias, asking people to correct for their 
exposure to contaminants, or warning people that they are about to be contaminated. Concen-
trating on the first mechanism, drawing people’s attention to potentially biasing information 
could lead to increased correction. For example, Strack et al. (1993) used a priming task that 
activated either positive or negative traits before asking respondents to form an impression of 
a target person. In addition, respondents were either reminded or not reminded of the priming 
task prior to the impression formation task. Strack et al. found a contrast effect away from the 
primes when respondents were reminded of the task but found no such correction among re-
spondents who were not reminded. In a study in a choice setting, Houghton et al. (1999) sen-
sitized consumers to factors that impact their choices (i.e., context effects) by explicitly stat-
ing the relation among the options in the set. They argued that making the context more trans-
parent may lead consumers to consider whether their preferences should be influenced by the 
positions of the options in the choice set under consideration, potentially reducing their sus-
ceptibility to context effects. The study showed that the explicit statement of the relative posi-
tions of the options in the set triggered correction processes, as such reducing the tendency to 
choose the compromise and asymmetrically dominating options.  
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Following the above reasoning, we hypothesize that making the truly unacceptable op-
tion and its truly unacceptable levels more explicit or salient in the set will trigger a correction 
process and reduce the unacceptable option’s effect on the final choice. We make the unac-
ceptable option more explicit by asking participants to mark truly unacceptable levels and 
corresponding options in an initial phase. This information is retained, and participants subse-
quently make a choice within a set still listing the screened out option(s), with the unaccepta-
ble level(s) in red and marked with a red asterisk. 
H2: Emphasizing the option’s unacceptability triggers a correction process, reduc-
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III.2 STUDY 2: THE REDUCTION OF THE TRULY UNAC-
CEPTABLE OPTION’S INFLUENCE BY MAKING THE UNAC-
CEPTABILITY SALIENT 
Study 2 examines the possibility of reduced influence of the truly unacceptable option 
on the decision process when its unacceptability is made salient (hypothesis 2). 
III.2.1 METHOD 
Participants. A total of 131 European university students participated in this second 
study. Seven of them were eliminated because they didn’t understand the meaning of a red 
level accompanied by an asterisk in the choice matrix (part of the explicit unacceptable ma-
nipulation). Two additional participants were dropped because they chose one of the options 
within the choice set, yet indicated truly unacceptable levels for each of these options in the 
initial phase. In return for a candy bar and a chance to win a city trip, participants spent about 
10 to 15 min. completing the survey on computers in a consumer lab.  
Task and Design. The task involved the choice of options from sets with three alterna-
tives, including an asymmetrically dominated decoy, in two categories (portable PC and res-
taurant; appendix 9). In each of the categories the unacceptable decoy was emphasized as de-
scribed above. To examine whether a decrease in relative choice share was obtained when 
comparing this explicit unacceptable case to the implicit one, we used data from study 1 for 
the same categories but for the case where the unacceptable decoy was more implicitly de-
fined. The findings for the two-option set, the three-option set with acceptable decoy, and the 
three-option set with implicit unacceptable decoy are taken from the previous study (table 4) 
and are repeated in the first three columns of results in table 8. These results show that there 
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were asymmetric dominance effects for both the acceptable (logistic regression model: χ2(3) = 
14.26, pinteraction term > .10, pdecoy type term < .001, b = 1.156) and the implicit unacceptable decoys 
(χ2(3) = 9.02, pinteraction term > .10, pdecoy type term < .01, b = 1.018), with no significant difference 
between these two effects (χ2(3) = .20, pinteraction term > .10, pdecoy type term > .10).  
Operationalization and Procedure. The operationalization of the current study is based 
on that detailed in study 1. The key difference is that this second study makes the unaccepta-
ble more explicit. In contrast to the first study, where the participant was asked to make a 
choice within a set listing an option with a possibly truly unacceptable label and to rate the 
unacceptability of this label afterwards, unacceptability is made explicit in this second study 
by rating and emphasizing unacceptability before making the final choice. In particular, the 
definition of a truly unacceptable level (Park 1978, 1982) was first given to participants. Next, 
the participant saw a productXattribute matrix, marked truly unacceptable levels for any of 
the three attributes, and then marked the corresponding truly unacceptable options. Partici-
pants were told that they were free to indicate any number of unacceptable levels per option 
and were free to mark any number of options as being truly unacceptable, including none at 
all (appendix 7). Following this marking process, the choice matrix was shown on a separate 
screen, still containing the option(s) marked as being truly unacceptable. Furthermore, the 
level they listed as truly unacceptable was printed in red and highlighted with a red asterisk to 
remind the participant that this level was in fact truly unacceptable and hence the option with 
that level should not be an option for final choice (appendix 8). This presentation of a truly 
unacceptable option with red levels in a choice matrix parallels what is done in realistic set-
tings (e.g.,  compusa.com, activebuyersguide.com and myproductadvisor.com; appendix 6).  
Appendix 10 contains screenshots of the unacceptability rating and the subsequent 
choice matrix as used in the Dutch questionnaire. 
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III.2.2 RESULTS 
Examining table 8, we observe a reduced effect of the unacceptable option when the op-
tion’s unacceptability is made salient, seemingly supporting hypothesis 2. There is a 12.2% 
drop in overall relative choice share when comparing the explicit to the implicit unacceptable 
decoy case. 
Table 8: Relative choice share T/(T+C) for the different choice set types, for each of the 
two product categories and overall 
Choice share of target relative to competitor (%) 






implicit unacceptable decoy 
Three-option set, 
explicit unacceptable decoy 

























Note. Sample sizes reported in parentheses under relative choice shares. 
 
The data used to test hypothesis 2 are from the first study for the implicit unacceptable 
results, using only those participants who rated the absence of the CE/Cleanliness label as 
truly unacceptable (in the asymmetric dominance setting, the percentages of truly unaccepta-
ble for the CE label and the Cleanliness label were respectively 72.2%, n = 54 and 54.7%, n = 
53). For the explicit unacceptable setting, only those participants marking the absence of the 
decoy’s label as truly unacceptable are included (CE label: 91.7% of the sample mark the la-
bel as truly unacceptable, n = 60; Cleanliness label: 75.8%, n = 62). In the current study, other 
levels of the three options could have been marked by participants as being unacceptable. 
However, in study 1 this was not an option. Thus, to keep the data as comparable as possible, 
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we did not omit participants from study 2 if they marked unacceptable levels for the continu-
ous attributes.  
A logistic regression analysis was run using the following model:  
 
with emphasized unacceptability being contrasted with implicit unacceptability and “product 
category” defined as portable PC, restaurant.  
Product category does not significantly moderate the preference-unacceptable type rela-
tionship (χ2(3) = 3.69, pinteraction term > .10). Most important, unacceptable type influences rela-
tive preference at a marginally significant level (punacceptable type term = .082). This, in combina-
tion with the negative b-coefficient (-.633), provides marginal support for hypothesis 2
10
.  
When applying the Fisher Exact Test in combination with chi-square statistics even this 
marginal support for hypothesis 2 no longer holds (χ2(4) = 7.5, p > .10).  
                                                 
 
10
 The above analysis is based on deviation coding for the product category variable. The results for the simple 
model containing only the decoy type as the independent variable are as follows: 
… unacceptable type influences relative preference at a marginally significant level (χ2(1) = 3.02, punacceptable type 
term = .088). This, in combination with the negative b-coefficient (-.613), provides marginal support for hypothe-
sis 2. 
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Table 9: Emphasized unacceptable decoy versus implicit unacceptable decoy - Fisher 
Exact Test per category and aggregated chi-square statistics 
Asymmetric dominance 
Product category p (Directional Fisher Exact Test) χ
2
(2) = -2*ln(p) 
Portable PC .275 2.6 
Restaurant .087 4.9 
Aggregate test (proportionality) χ
2
(4) = 7.5, p > .10; Critical χ
2
 value for (α = .10) = 7.78 
III.2.3 DISCUSSION 
Correction is moderate when making the option’s unacceptability salient in the choice 
set. Thus, the distorting effect of the unacceptable on choice seems surprisingly robust. In 
addition, comparing the relative choice share for the explicit unacceptable decoy to the no 
decoy case in table 8 still shows an increasing trend (of 9.4%). A comparison of these shares 
might not be strictly appropriate, as they are obtained in different experiments, using different 
unacceptability manipulations. Nevertheless, if anything they hint at the possibility that con-
text effects still occur even when unacceptability is made salient; the truly unacceptable and 
clearly screened out option may influence the subsequent decision process.  
In combination, these first two studies suggest that the presence of a truly unacceptable 
option in the choice set affects the final choice between the remaining alternatives and that 
even drawing people’s attention to the option’s unacceptable status does not seem to nullify 
its effect (perhaps suggesting a nonconscious process). However, these findings have to be 
interpreted in the light of the unacceptable option’s operationalization. In study 1 the option’s 
unacceptability might not have been clear from the outset, thus causing attribute levels other 
than the unacceptable aspect to be processed before the option’s unacceptable status was rec-
ognized. In study 2, even though the unacceptable level was printed in red in the choice ma-
trix, participants had to process all the attribute levels present in the matrix, including the lev-
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els other than the unacceptable aspect for the decoy option, because they were asked to evalu-
ate each attribute level and to mark those experienced as truly unacceptable. Thus, we exam-
ine whether the findings of studies 1 and 2 hold when the unacceptable status is made clear up 
front (which more closely resembles the phased choice processing mentioned in the introduc-
tion to hypothesis 1a). In addition, unacceptable status was idiosyncratically defined across 
participants in studies 1 and 2. In both studies labels were introduced to make the decoy an 
unacceptable alternative (e.g., CE label absent), but it was up to the participant to define 
whether the absence of such a label was truly unacceptable to him or her. A self-selection bias 
might have resulted because of this (self-selection bias is possible whenever the group of peo-
ple being studied has any form of control over whether to participate. Participants' decision to 
participate may be correlated with traits that affect the study, making the participants a non-
representative sample. For example, volutary IQ-tests are more likely to be taken by people 
who think they are more intelligent than the average).  
A third study was designed to alleviate the above two issues by introducing an agent 
task. Participants were asked to imagine that they had been asked by their best friend to buy 
him/her a digital photo camera, with the friend listing demands (e.g., “I definitely want a 
pocket-sized model. Any larger or smaller model is truly unacceptable to me, so I don’t want 
you to buy such a camera for me no matter what else it has to offer”) and preferences (e.g., 
“The higher the camera’s reliability, the better”) with regard to the camera. Thus, it was no 
longer up to the participant to decide for himself/herself whether, for example, the presence of 
a medium-sized camera in the choice set was treated as truly unacceptable or not. Further-
more, this formulation of demands and preferences caused camera size to be a rejection induc-
ing dimension and reliability to be a relative preference dimension, and the former has been 
shown to be the most important attribute in the early phase of the decision making process 
(Park 1982). In combination with the positioning of the camera size attribute on the left in the 
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choice matrix (assuming the common reading order is from the left to the right), this should 
cause size to be the first attribute focused on in the matrix, making the decoy option’s unac-
ceptability clear from the outset without having to process values other than the unacceptable 
aspect before finding this out. The use of an agent task in study 3 also made it possible to em-
phasize the alternative’s unacceptable status (as such perhaps triggering a correction process) 
by printing the unacceptable level in red without the inclusion of a preceding marking process 
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III.3 STUDY 3: THE TRULY UNACCEPTABLE OPTION AND 
THE FINAL CHOICE MADE – A STRONG TEST AND AN EXAM-
INATION OF THE NONCONSCIOUS PROCESS IDEA 
The third study accomplished several goals. Beyond providing a strong test of the effect 
of the unacceptable option on subsequent choice by making the unacceptable status clear from 
the beginning and no longer idiosyncratic, as delineated in the previous study, a second goal 
was to offer a more complete test of study 2’s idea by including all the necessary choice sets 
within the same experiment (i.e., no decoy, acceptable decoy, black unacceptable decoy, and 
red unacceptable decoy). Furthermore, compromise was included as a choice context in addi-
tion to asymmetric dominance. A third goal was to examine the “nonconscious process” idea 
(part of the introduction to hypothesis 1b and suggested on the basis of study 2’s findings) by 
including funnel debriefing.  
III.3.1 METHOD 
Participants. A total of 350 European university students participated in this third study. 
Fourteen were eliminated because they incorrectly treated the acceptable decoy’s size as truly 
unacceptable, or vice versa. Also participants who did not focus on the size attribute for the 
decoy option first or did not understand the meaning of a red level accompanied by an asterisk 
in the choice matrix were eliminated. The survey was administered in a consumer lab using a 
computer and took about 20 min. to complete. In return for their cooperation, participants 
received a cinema ticket.  
Task and Design. The experiment employed a 3 (Decoy Type: acceptable/ black unac-
ceptable/ red unacceptable) x 2 (Context Type: asymmetric dominance versus compromise) 
between-subjects design, with an additional control group (no decoy).  
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The task involved the choice of a digital photo camera for a close friend, taking his de-
mands and preferences into account. The specific demand was varied across decoy type, in 
the sense that the friend defined a medium-sized camera as truly unacceptable in the black and 
the red unacceptable decoy conditions, and this same medium-sized camera as acceptable in 
the acceptable decoy condition. In each of the conditions, the target and the competitor always 
had an acceptable level for the size attribute (i.e., pocket-sized). The black versus red unac-
ceptable decoy was varied by printing the camera’s medium size level in black or red. In this 
latter case a note below the choice matrix reminded the participant of the decoy’s unaccepta-
ble status. Appendix 11 shows the specific wording of the friend’s demands and preferences 
per condition and the corresponding choice matrices.  
Operationalization. As in studies 1 and 2, a categorical attribute (i.e., camera size) de-
fined the decoy’s unacceptability, and two continuous attributes (i.e., reliability and resolu-
tion) defined the context relationships (appendix 13). To control for differences in choice due 
to any factor different from the context, the following steps were taken: (1) there were identi-
cal absolute score differences between target and competitor (i.e., 16.6 - 14.4 = 7.6 – 5.4 = 2.2 
units) and identical range spans (i.e., [11-20], [2-11], difference of 9 units) for both reliability 
and resolution, in order to not affect the relative importance of the attributes, (2) target and 
competitor were positioned the same percentage above and below the average value for both 
attributes, and (3) caution was taken to not create an attribute-balance effect (e.g., large dis-
persion of attribute values within the competitor and small dispersion within the target, lead-
ing to choice of the target. The use of different scale metrics, in particular a 20-point scale for 
reliability and megapixels for resolution, made the attribute-balance effect less likely to occur; 
Chernev 2004, 2005). In addition, acceptable and realistic levels for both continuous attributes 
were used.  
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A pretest preceded this third study, to determine appropriate continuous attribute, attrib-
ute level and market range combinations that ensured roughly equal preferences for both tar-
get and competitor in the two-alternative condition. This test was completed by 215 university 
students. Another purpose of this pretest was to check whether the friend’s defining camera 
size as a rejection inducing dimension and the positioning of the size attribute on the left in 
the choice matrix directed the participants’ attention first to this attribute.   
Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine buying a digital photo camera for a close 
friend, with the latter specifying his/her demands and preferences with regard to the camera. 
Next the attributes camera size, reliability and resolution were described and market ranges 
were given. As in studies 1 and 2, they were told that the other attributes, including price, 
were identical for the different options (see appendix 14 for a screenshot). After processing 
this information, the participant made a choice from a productXattribute matrix, with the in-
structions stating that the camera was bought for a close friend, not for oneself, and that the 
friend’s demands and preferences had to be taken into account (see appendix 14 for a screen-
shot). The specific demand and choice matrix shown to the participant depended upon which 
of the seven choice set conditions he or she was in.    
After choosing a camera for his/her friend, participants went through a funnel debriefing 
task, adapted from Fitzsimons and Shiv (2001) and Chinander and Schweitzer (2003). The 
purpose of this task was to shed light on the possibly nonconscious nature of the unacceptable 
alternative’s influence on the final choice between the remaining options in the set. First, par-
ticipants were asked to describe whatever went through their mind while they were deciding 
between the different cameras, and what they thought the aim of the study was. The second 
part was more specific, and asked for factors (perhaps less obvious ones) directing the partici-
pant’s camera choice and to describe in what way, both in open-ended form and by checking 
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factors from a list of possible factors (including presentation sequence in the table, the scores 
of camera C
11
, the table’s blue background colour, the size levels of cameras A and B, and red 
attribute levels). There was a special interest in whether participants marked camera C’s relia-
bility and resolution scores in the latter question, as this could point to a more conscious na-
ture of the unacceptable option’s influence on final choice. The other factors were mainly 
included as distractors. If participants did not mark the scores of camera C as an influential 
factor, a final part asked: “What if I told you that you choosing camera B and not camera A 
was very likely influenced by the presence of camera C in the set? What would you say?” and 
“What if I told you that you choosing camera B and not A, was very likely influenced by 
camera C’s reliability and resolution scores? What would you say?” The funnel debriefing 
task concluded with a question asking whether camera C was treated as an acceptable alterna-
tive while choosing a camera for the friend to verify whether it was experienced as an unac-
ceptable camera. 
 Next, participants were asked to indicate what attribute level they first looked at for 
camera C: “medium”, “18.05”12, “3.95” or “don’t know anymore”. As a reminder the initial 
choice matrix was reproduced below, showing only camera C’s levels (i.e., empty cells for 
cameras A and B). In a subsequent question unacceptability was assessed for each score pre-
sent in the choice matrix: “Mark the scores that you experienced as truly unacceptable while 
choosing the best possible camera for your friend. Note that you are free to mark any number 
of levels, including none at all.” Prior to this assessment, the definition of a truly unacceptable 
level (Park 1978, 1982) was shown to the participant (appendix 12). Finally, participants were 
asked whether all scores in the choice matrix were printed in black. If their answer was “no” 
                                                 
 
11
 Camera C coincides with the unacceptable decoy, camera A with the competitor and camera B with the target. 
12
 “18.05” or “16.60” depending on the specific condition the participant was in. 
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or “don’t know anymore”, they were asked about the possible meaning of printing a level in 
red and highlighting it with a red asterisk (* red) in the choice matrix.  
III.3.2 RESULTS 
 The unacceptability assessment and whether “medium” was the first attribute level 
looked at for the unacceptable decoy are used to restrict the analyses to only those partici-
pants: (1) not marking the pocket size level for cameras A and B as truly unacceptable (4 par-
ticipants eliminated), (2) marking camera C’s medium size level as truly unacceptable or not 
depending upon the condition they were in (unacceptable versus acceptable) (7 participants 
eliminated), and (3) focusing on the size level for camera C first, as this implied that the val-
ues other than the unacceptable aspect didn’t need to be processed before finding out the op-
tion was truly unacceptable (1 participant eliminated). 
 At the outset of study 3 several goals were mentioned, the first of which is a strong test 
of the effect of the unacceptable alternative on final choice by making the unacceptable status 
clear from the beginning and no longer idiosyncratic, and a second goal is a more complete 
test of study 2’s idea by including all the necessary choice sets within the same experiment. 
For this the choice share of the target relative to the competitor is computed for seven differ-
ent choice set types (table 10; the necessary preliminary restrictions are detailed in the previ-
ous paragraph), and used in comparisons identical to those carried out in studies 1 and 2.  
 As in study 1, we see that the classic asymmetric dominance and compromise effects 
replicate. Adding an asymmetrically dominated or extreme decoy to the two-option set in-
creases the relative share of the target from 53.1% to 81.3% and 88.9% respectively. When 
the decoy’s unacceptability is made clear up front, we see that a slight increase in the asym-
metric dominance target’s share is still obtained (59.2% versus 53.1%), although the magni-
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tude of the effect is no longer comparable to that of the acceptable decoy (59.2% versus 
81.3%). For compromise, there is no increase in target share relative to the two-option set 
(53.1%). Thus it appears that making the decoy’s unacceptable nature clear from the begin-
ning still shows a small asymmetric dominance effect, whereas the compromise effect is elim-
inated (we report significance tests below).  
 The small effect of the unacceptable decoy seems to be robust for the asymmetric domi-
nance setting. Emphasizing the option’s unacceptability in the choice matrix with red print 
still shows an increase in target share when compared to the two-option set (60.4% versus 
53.1%) and is roughly equivalent to the black unacceptable decoy set (59.2%). Study 3 added 
a compromise setting, showing a decrease in target share when comparing the red to the black 
unacceptable decoy though (45.8% versus 53.1%). The target share for the emphasized unac-
ceptable even drops below that of the two-option set.  
Table 10: Relative choice share T/(T+C)  for the different choice set types, for the digi-
tal photo camera category 



































Note. Sample sizes reported in parentheses under relative choice shares. 
 
 A formal test based on the Fisher Exact Test (one-sided), because of the rather limited 
number of participants per cell, shows that the classic asymmetric dominance and compro-
mise effects are statistically significant (pacceptable, asymmetric dominance < .01, pacceptable, compromise < 
.001). However, making the decoy unacceptable and communicating this status up front no 
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longer yields a significant asymmetric dominance effect (pblack unacceptable = .342 > .10) or a 
significant compromise effect (pblack unacceptable = .580 > .10). Thus, the findings of study 1 do 
not replicate. As no effect is found for the black unacceptable condition, drawing attention 
towards the unacceptable status by printing the unacceptable value in red in order to make the 
participant increasingly aware of a possible contamination, and to instigate a correction pro-
cess (as done in study 2), may no longer make sense. For sake of completeness the p-values 
are included when contrasting the red with the black unacceptable decoy and the red unac-
ceptable decoy with the no decoy set: pred vs. black unacceptable, asymmetric dominance = .467 > .10, pred vs. 
black unacceptable, compromise = .306 > .10, pred unacceptable vs. no decoy, asymmetric dominance = .300 > .10, pred 
unacceptable vs. no decoy, compromise = .694 > .10.  
III.3.3 DISCUSSION 
 The findings of this third study show no influence of the unacceptable option on the 
consumer’s final choice between the remaining options in the set. One simple explanation 
would be that participants did not look at the values other than the unacceptable aspect. As 
mentioned in the introduction to hypothesis 1a, if information that an option is unacceptable 
leads to its immediate elimination in an initial editing phase, this will limit any impact of that 
alternative (and the information it contains) on the final choice. The operationalization of 
study 3, as opposed to that of study 1, was precisely aimed at making the decoy option’s un-
acceptability clear from the outset so that participants would not have to process values other 
than the unacceptable aspect before finding this out (i.e., camera size was made a rejection 
inducing dimension by way of the agent task, and this attribute was listed on the left in the 
choice matrix). Unfortunately, to the extent that people did not look at the other attribute val-
ues, the funnel debriefing task becomes less useful.   
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 However, the operationalization of study 3 may have been too restrictive. Because of 
the agent task the participant had to buy a specific digital photo camera for a friend and not 
for oneself, and hence might have been less willing to exert processing effort (immediately 
eliminating the camera with an unacceptable size would conform to the friend’s specifica-
tions, be easy to justify, would be likely to gain the favor of the friend, and would reduce 
cognitive work by analyzing only two options instead of three; Lerner and Tetlock 1999), and  
less curious as to what is foregone by dropping the unacceptable option. In addition, the ex-
perimenter (under the guise of the friend) made it very clear to the participant in the introduc-
tion to the choice matrix that it definitely had to be a pocket-sized model. Any other model 
would be truly unacceptable, and thus should not be the participant’s final choice no matter 
what else it had to offer. Might this rather blatant instruction have created a demand effect, in 
the sense that participants felt they were expected to immediately prune the medium-sized 
camera from the decision structure, together with the further information it contains, and thus 
not to look at the reliability and resolution levels of the unacceptable decoy? 
 Perhaps the above issues could be remedied by another operationalization using a buy 
for oneself task and a less explicit unacceptability instruction
13
, still making sure that the un-
acceptable status is not idiosyncratically defined across participants and clear from the begin-
ning. For example, see the possible operationalization in figure 8: (1) this operationalization 
asks participants to imagine having found themselves a flat to live in while studying at the 
university. A floor plan of the flat is included, showing some missing pieces of furniture and 
appliances (e.g., a refrigerator). Participants are subsequently asked to go shopping for these 
items. This portrays a realistic situation for the subject pool (i.e., students); (2) a less explicit 
unacceptability instruction is realized by including the floor plan, showing size constraints for 
                                                 
 
13
 This would make the task less mechanical, automatic, and artificial. 
  
Gone But Not Forgotten: The Role of Unacceptable Options in Decision Making p. 83 
 
some of the missing pieces (e.g., the refrigerator has to fit below a counter with a height of 95 
cm, implying that a refrigerator with a height of 100 cm will be truly unacceptable). Words 
such as “truly unacceptable” and “constraint” will not be part of the introduction to minimize 
the chance of participants showing a possible demand effect as detailed above. It is up to the 
participants to take the size constraint into account at the moment they are deciding between 
the different refrigerators in the choice table. This is thought to be a common practice in daily 
life. To further reduce the potential transparency of the task, the product categories couch and 
standing lamp are included as filler items (next to the refrigerator) (Sen and Johnson 1997). 
These items are also missing in the flat and need to be bought, with the floor plan specifying 
size constraints for the couch. An additional advantage of using the floor plan is increasing 
the participants’ imagery with regard to the experimental task; (3) showing the counter’s 
height on the floor plan, in combination with the inclusion of a particular size level in the 
choice matrix, implies that the refrigerator’s unacceptability is not idiosyncratically defined; 
and finally (4) the floor plan defining the refrigerator’s maximum height (turning height into a 
rejection inducing dimension) and the choice matrix showing the height attribute on the left 
assure the option’s unacceptability is clear from the beginning.  
 After making choices within the three categories couch, refrigerator and standing lamp, 
the questionnaire would be very similar to the one used in study 3, with a focus on the refrig-
erator choice: funnel debriefing task, attribute first looked at for refrigerator C (e.g., “height”, 
“reliability”, “energy efficiency”, “don’t know anymore”), and attribute levels treated as truly 
unacceptable while choosing. A question checking for a possible demand effect could be add-
ed: “Do you think the experimenter expected you to make your choice in a specific fashion?” 
If the answer is “yes”, they will be asked to describe in what fashion (Fitzsimons and Shiv 
2001).  
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 Another issue that could be addressed in future research concerns the effects of the de-
gree of elaboration participants engaged in. The initial comparisons of the relative choice 
shares in table 10 showed an increasing trend when adding to the two-option set a decoy ex-
perienced as unacceptable by the decision maker and making the target a dominating option. 
No effect, or even a downward trend, seemed present for an unacceptable decoy making the 
target a compromise option. How might this discrepancy be understood? Might an noncon-
scious process be active in the asymmetric dominance setting, and a correction process in the 
compromise setting? A factor crucial in making this distinction is “cognitive elaboration”, as 
an increase in elaboration has been shown to result in an increase of the bias when the under-
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lying process is believed to be a nonconscious one (Fitzsimons et al. 2002; Fitzsimons and 
Shiv 2001; Sen and Johnson 1997) and in a decrease of the bias following several models of 
bias correction, for example Martin’s set-reset approach (1986) and Schwarz and Bless’ inclu-
sion-exclusion model (1992). These models argue that people tend to engage in a two-stage 
process, the first stage being associated with “uncorrected” and lower effort default outcomes 
and the second stage with more effortful “corrected” outcomes. Martin (1986) argued that 
when individuals
 
take the task seriously,
 
they assess not only
 





the factors that shape
 
that immediate reaction. If
 
the individual identifies a
 
contextual cue as a
 
factor in their reaction
 
and believes that the
 
contextual cue is inappropri-
ately
 
biasing their genuine reaction,
 
a motivated individual will
 
reset their judgment away
 
from the influence of
 
the cue.  
 A procedure used to increase the level of cognitive elaboration is telling participants 
before making their choice that there will be a justification task later in the study (Webster, 
Richter, and Kruglanski 1996). The current experiment included a scale intended to measure 
the level of process accountability induced by the agent task (Zhang and Mittal 2005) that was 
reduced to a single item (“I believed that I would have to explain the process of choosing to 
my friend”) because of a rather disappointing Cronbach alpha (.578). A logistic regression 
analysis was run including the decoy type x process accountability term, with the decoy type 
term defined as “unacceptable, asymmetric dominance” setting versus “unacceptable, com-
promise” setting14. This interaction term was significant (χ2(3) = 12.49, p < .01), and the na-
ture of the relationship is visualized in figure 9. In the asymmetric dominance context, the 
                                                 
 
14
 The black unacceptable and red unacceptable decoy conditions were pooled together as the additional empha-
sis did not alter how increased accountability affected the target share for both contexts (χ2(7) = 13.15, pdecoy type x 
process accountability x emphasis  = .835 > .10).  
In the no decoy condition, no relationship was found between process accountability and the target share (χ2(1) = 
.212, p = .646 > .10). 
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contaminative effect of the unacceptable option is significantly enhanced for an increasing 
accountability level (pprocess accountability term = .01, b = .370). In the compromise setting, this ef-
fect is marginally significantly attenuated (pprocess accountability term = .08 < .10, b = -.237). These 
findings are quite suggestive and are consistent with the notion that asymmetric dominance is 
a more perceptual, automatic process and compromise a more conscious process, as conclud-
ed in earlier research (e.g., Dhar and Simonson 2003). However, these findings have to be 
treated with caution, because the initial idea is based on trends in target share only, a single 
item measure is used to operationalize process accountability, and the sample size is rather 
small.  
 When performing an additional study using the floor plan operationalization (to reduce 
a possible demand effect), a cognitive elaboration manipulation (e.g., the introduction to the 
choice task guarantees confidentiality versus mentions the presence of a justification task later 
on in the study; Simonson 1989; Tetlock, Lerner, and Boettger 1996) could be included to 
shed additional light on the underlying process. A differential effect of increasing accountabil-
ity on the target share for both contexts (i.e., asymmetric dominance and compromise) in the 
case of an unacceptable decoy would then point to the influence of the unacceptable option on 
the final choice running through a nonconscious process or not depending upon how the de-
coy adds to the final choice context (i.e., the type of relationships it creates between the op-
tions in the set ).  
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Figure 9: Process accountability causing an increase or a decrease of the bias de-
pending on the context relationship defined by the unacceptable option 
Unacceptable decoy setting: effect of felt process accountability on 
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CHAPTER IV :  
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CHAPTER IV :  
SUMMARY AND OVERALL DISCUSSION 
IV.1 SUMMARY 
In many situations consumers engage in a phased narrowing of choice options, editing 
out options that fail to meet some acceptable criteria. Intuition would suggest that once an 
option has been edited out of the choice set, it should not have any impact on subsequent 
choices. For the case of well-known context effects such as asymmetric dominance and com-
promise, however, study 1 shows that the presence of a truly unacceptable option in the 
choice set influences the final choice between the remaining options. That is, the presence of a 
truly unacceptable option in the set (e.g., a digital photo camera without a CE label) biases the 
consumer’s final choice by affecting the perceived context within which the final choice is 
made. The information on the continuous attributes (e.g., reliability and resolution) character-
izing the unacceptable option is responsible for this altering of the perceived context. Study 2 
focuses on reducing the unacceptable option’s contaminating effect on final choice (for the 
asymmetric dominance setting), attempting to trigger a correction process by making the op-
tion’s unacceptability more salient in the set. Participants are asked to mark truly unaccepta-
ble levels and corresponding options in an initial phase, and they subsequently make a choice 
within a set still listing the screened out option(s) with the unacceptable level(s) in red and 
marked with a red asterisk. Only a moderate correction of the unacceptable’s influence is 
found.  
In combination, studies 1 and 2 suggest that the presence of a truly unacceptable option 
in the choice set affects the final choice between the remaining alternatives, and that even 
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drawing people’s attention to the option’s unacceptable status does not seem to nullify its ef-
fect (perhaps suggesting a nonconscious process). Study 3 provides a stronger test of the un-
acceptable option’s effect by making the unacceptable status clear from the beginning, so that 
individuals do not have to process values other than the unacceptable aspect before finding 
this out. In addition, unacceptability was no longer idiosyncratic across participants (in studies 
1 and 2 it was up to the participant to define whether the absence of the CE label
15
 was truly 
unacceptable or not). For this an agent task was introduced: participants were asked to imag-
ine that they had been asked by their best friend to buy him/her a digital photo camera, with 
the friend listing demands (e.g., “I definitely want a pocket-sized model. Any larger or small-
er model is truly unacceptable to me, so I don’t want you to buy such a camera for me no mat-
ter what else it has to offer”) and preferences (e.g., “The higher the camera’s reliability, the 
better”) with regard to the camera. The friend’s demand16 in combination with the medium 
size level in the choice matrix determined whether the option was truly unacceptable or not. 
In addition, the introduction of a constraint on the size attribute only, together with its left 
position in the choice matrix, assured it was the first attribute focused on during the choice 
process. Under these more stringent conditions an effect of the unacceptable option on the 
subsequent choice was no longer found (this holds for both the asymmetric dominance and 
the compromise setting). One simple explanation would be that participants did not look at 
the values other than the unacceptable aspect. When keeping in mind that study 3’s operation-
alization, as opposed to that of study 1, was precisely aimed at making the decoy option’s 
unacceptability clear from the outset so that participants would not have to process values 
                                                 
 
15
 The CE label was varied across conditions: the presence of the CE label in the set made the camera acceptable, 
whereas the absence of the label made it truly unacceptable, but only if experienced as such by the participant. 
See appendices 2 and 3. 
16
 The demand was varied across conditions: “I definitely want a pocket-sized model” made the medium-sized 
model truly unacceptable; “I definitely want a pocket- or medium-sized model” made the medium-sized model 
acceptable. See appendix 11. 
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other than the unacceptable aspect before finding this out, this explanation seems particularly 
tenable. Unfortunately, to the extent that people did not look at the other attribute values, the 
funnel debriefing task included to examine the nonconscious process idea and the red unac-
ceptable level introduced to increase the awareness of a possible bias due to the unacceptable 
option and lead to correction become less useful.  
 However, the operationalization of study 3 may have been too restrictive. Because of 
the agent task the participant had to buy a specific digital photo camera for a friend and not 
for oneself, and as a consequence might have been more cognitively lazy and less curious as 
to what is foregone. In addition, the rather blatant instructions given by the experimenter (un-
der the guise of the friend) with regard to the camera’s size level (using terms such as “truly 
unacceptable to me”, “don’t want you to buy such a camera”, and “no matter what else it has 
to offer”)  might have created a demand effect. That is, participants might have felt they were 
expected to immediately prune the medium-sized camera from the decision structure, together 
with the further information it contains, and thus not to look at the reliability and resolution 
levels of the unacceptable decoy.  
 The above issues could be resolved in a future study, using a buy for oneself task and a 
less explicit unacceptability instruction, still making sure that the unacceptable status is clear 
from the beginning and not idiosyncratically defined across participants. Perhaps under these 
modified conditions participants (even though the option’s unacceptability is clear up front) 
still process the values other than the unacceptable aspect, leading to an effect of the unac-
ceptable option on the subsequent choice. For example, the participants may be asked to buy 
some pieces of furniture and appliances (e.g., a refrigerator) for a flat they have rented, taking 
the floor plan of the flat into account. This plan shows among other things that the refrigerator 
has to fit below a counter with a certain height. Thus, a refrigerator exceeding this height will 
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be truly unacceptable. Words such as “truly unacceptable” and “constraint” will not be part of 
the introduction to minimize the chance of participants showing a possible demand effect as 
detailed above. It is up to the participants to take the size constraint into account at the mo-
ment they are deciding between the different refrigerators in the choice table. This is thought 
to be a common practice in daily life. 
 In addition to a modified unacceptability operationalization, a future study could ma-
nipulate the level of cognitive elaboration participants engage in. The trends in target share 
found in study 3 show (1) an increase when adding to the two-option set a decoy experienced 
as unacceptable by the decision maker and making the target a dominating option and (2) a 
status quo, or even a decrease, for an unacceptable decoy making the target a compromise 
option. The elaboration factor may suggest a nonconscious process being active in the asym-
metric dominance setting and a conscious correction process in the compromise setting by 
showing an increase in the unacceptable option’s influence for increasing elaboration in the 
former setting and a decrease in bias in the latter. This is exactly what study 3 showed, opera-
tionalizing the level of elaboration by measuring process accountability as induced by the 
agent task (“I believed that I would have to explain the process of choosing to my friend”). To 
further explore this idea of nonconscious versus correction processes being responsible for the 
possible presence versus absence of an effect of the unacceptable option on final choice de-
pending upon how the unacceptable adds to the final choice context, the level of elaboration 
could be manipulated in future research. Study 1’s finding (when applying the Fisher Exact 
Test in combination with chi-square statistics) that in the compromise setting the target share 
is significantly decreased when comparing the unacceptable to the acceptable decoy, whereas 
no decrease is found for the asymmetric dominance setting, might also fit in with this idea.  
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 Table 11 below gives an overview of factors differing between the several studies, keep-
ing in mind that each of them may have its own implications as to whether the unacceptable 
option biases the subsequent choice or not.  
Table 11: Overview of different operationalizations and procedures used for the differ-
ent studies 
Factor Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Future study 
Buy for oneself  x x  x 
Buy for a friend   x  
Blatant unacceptability instruction   x  
Unacceptable status is clear from the beginning, so values other than 
the unacceptable aspect need not be processed before finding this out 
  x x 
Unacceptable status not idiosyncratically defined across participants   x x 
Unacceptable status is measured after making one’s choice  
(appendices 3 and 12) 
x  x x 
Unacceptable status is measured before making one’s choice  
(appendix 7) 
 x   
Red level included  x x x 
Funnel debriefing included   x x 
Cognitive elaboration measured (i.e., process accountability)   x  
Cognitive elaboration manipulated (i.e., confidential versus justify ones 
choice) 
   x 
Asymmetric dominance context included x x x x 
Compromise context included x  x x 
Unacceptability of decoy varied in choice matrix 
(label present versus absent, appendix 2) 
x x   
Unacceptability of decoy varied in introduction to choice matrix  
(medium-sized camera defined by the friend as truly unacceptable or 
not, appendix 11; varying the counter’s height in the floor plan) 
  x x 
Number of product categories presented to the same participant 11 1 1 3 
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IV.2 OVERALL DISCUSSION 
 The starting point of this dissertation was whether the presence of a truly unacceptable 
option influences the final choice between the remaining options in the set by adding to the 
final choice context. Studies 1 to 3 suggest that an answer to this question is dependent upon 
(1) the percentage of participants still looking at values other than the unacceptable aspect, if 
the unacceptability is communicated up front and (2) how the unacceptable adds to the final 
choice context (making the target a dominating or a compromise option), perhaps operating 
through either a nonconscious or a correction process. This dependence limits the potential 
impact of the unacceptable option on decision making.  
 In the literature traits can be found showing a possible relationship with whether or not 
values other than the unacceptable aspect are processed. Examples include the curiosity and 
exploration inventory developed by Kashdan, Rose and Fincham (2004) (with items such as 
“I would describe myself as someone who activily seeks as much information as I can in a 
new situation” and “I am not the type of person who probes deeply into new situations or 
things”) and the need for closure scale, with people characterized by a low (high) concern 
about closure showing more (less) processing of these other values (Kardes et al. 2004; 
Kruglanski and Webster 1996). One of the five need for closure factors that seems particularly 
interesting is the decisiveness facet (containing items such as “I would describe myself as 
indecisive” and “I tend to struggle with most decisions”; Neuberg, Jeudice, and West 1997). 
These traits may be included in future research as moderators of the relationship between the 
truly unacceptable option and the final choice made within the set.  
If made clear from the beginning that the option is truly unacceptable, this option’s val-
ues other than the unacceptable aspect may be looked at swiftly or even nonconsciously. As 
mentioned by Chartrand (2005), in the context of her model of automatic processes, the con-
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sumer may not be consciously noting the environmental trigger. In addition, a vast body of 
literature exists around the concept of unconscious perception, defined by Merikle and Joor-
dens (1997) as “perceiving information even when we do not have the subjective experience 
of perceiving.” This information perceived without awareness has also been shown to bias 
what stimuli are perceived with awareness and to influence how stimuli perceived with 
awareness are consciously experienced (see article by Merikle, Smilek, and Eastwood 2001 
for examples in the psychological field). Treisman’s filter-attenuation theory (1960) (see 
Merikle and Joordens (1997) for a detailed discussion of this theory) further supports possible 
interference of unconsciously perceived stimuli with ongoing intentional actions. This reason-
ing would make it possible for the unacceptable option to still impact subsequent choice even 
if the decision maker does not show thorough processing of the levels other than the unac-
ceptable aspect.  
Although making the unacceptable status clear from the beginning offers a stronger test 
of the unacceptable option’s effect, one could argue in favor of this status often not being 
clear up front. In real life, situations may exist where the option is known to be unacceptable 
only afterwards (i.e., in a later stage of the decision making process): in a sales talk the sales-
person may delay the discussion of rejection inducing dimensions such as the price or the size 
of a refrigerator (as such trying to influence the consumer’s final choice). Also, if buying a 
less familiar product, the consumer may gather information on all the available attributes, 
learning only afterwards what dimensions may lead to rejection of an option no matter what 
else it has to offer. In such situations the impact of the unacceptable option is expected to be 
larger.  
The (provisional) finding that the unacceptable affects the final choice through a more 
conscious or nonconscious process depending upon how it adds to the final choice context 
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(making the target a compromise or a dominating option) gives additional support to the no-
tion that compromise is a more conscious process, and asymmetric dominance a more percep-
tual, automatic process, as concluded in earlier research (Dhar and Simonson 2003). 
In sum, whether unacceptable options affect further decision making is dependent upon 
factors such as whether the unacceptable status is clear from the beginning, whether values 
other than the unacceptable aspect are examined further (perhaps unconsciously), and whether 
the type of relationship defined between the options in the set by the addition of the unac-
ceptable option causes the underlying process to be conscious or not, thus leading to a correc-
tion or a continuation of the unacceptable option’s effect (figure 10). Hopefully, the 
knowledge gathered in this dissertation leads to a more integrated framework for the role of 
unacceptable options in decision making, with the suggestions for future research being a next 
step in this direction.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1:  
STUDY 1 – DEFINITION OF THE LABELS 
CE label:  stands for Conformité Européene. Buying a product WITHOUT the CE label on 
the EU market is illegal, and use of it may be unhealthy (e.g., harmful radiation), unsafe (e.g., 
explosion danger), or dangerous for the environment. On the other hand, a product that is 
marked WITH the CE label conforms with all the health, safety and environmental protection 
standards of the European Union (relating to the consumer). It is therefore eligible to be sold 
within the countries of the EU.  
 
GMI label: Made with GMI stands for “Made with Genetically Modified Ingredients”. With-
in the EU market labelling concerning genetically modified ingredients is introduced (Regula-
tion EC no. 1830/2003, issued by the European Parliament and the Council of 22 september 
2003). Cornflakes WITH the “Made with GMIs” label will contain genetically modified ingre-
dients. These genetic alterations may include viral and insect resistance, increased yields, and 
enhanced shelf life. Cornflakes WITHOUT the “Made with GMIs” label will not contain genet-
ically modified ingredients. 
EU flower label: stands for the European eco-label. Within the EU market the EU flower 
is introduced, which is supervised by the European Union Eco-labelling Board. This board is 
composed of different stakeholders: competent bodies of the member states, representatives 
from environmental NGOs, from consumer and industry associations, from trade unions, and 
observers from other countries. Printer paper WITH the “EU flower” label assures customers 
that the wood used in the product was harvested in an environmentally responsible way that 
maintains the sustainability of the forest and preserves wildlife and forest ecosystems. Printer 
paper WITHOUT the “EU flower” label means that the product comes from forests that aren’t 
managed in an environmentally friendly manner.  
 
Cleanliness label (linked to restaurant):  A restaurant WITHOUT the 
“Cleanliness” label has obtained a bad rating by the restaurant inspection committee regarding 
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the overall cleanliness of the restaurant, and this relates to the dining room ánd the cooking 
area. A restaurant WITH the “Cleanliness” label on the other hand has been favourably evalu-
ated by the committee on the cleanliness of the dining room and the cooking area.  
 
Cleanliness label (linked to overnight accommodation):   An establishment 
WITHOUT the “Cleanliness” label has obtained a bad rating by Michelin, and thus does not 
offer clean accomodation (and this relates to bedroom, private facilities, eating area and kitch-
en). An accomodation WITH the “Cleanliness” label on the other hand, has been favourably 
evaluated by Michelin concerning the overall cleanliness of the accommodation.   
 
FireSafety label:  Renting a room WITHOUT the “FireSafety” label indicates a 
problem regarding the presence of smoke-fire detection and/or of a second escape route (e.g., 
no escape ladder, no flat roof), and/or of the fire extinguisher (e.g., not present on each floor, 
no yearly check-up). On the other hand, renting a student room WITH the “FireSafety” label 
conforms to the standards of Fire Department, and shows no problems regarding the smoke-
fire detection, the second escape route and the fire extinguisher. 
 
RoomQuality label:  Renting a room WITHOUT the “RoomQuality” label indicates a prob-
lem regarding bad hygiene, mouldy smells, mildew on the walls or insulation. On the other 
hand, renting a student room WITH the “RoomQuality” label conforms with the standards of 
the University’s Housing Department, and will not lead to hygiene, moisture or insulation 
problems. 
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APPENDIX 2:  
STUDY 1 – CHOICE MATRIX: NO DECOY, ACCEPTABLE DECOY, 
BLACK UNACCEPTABLE DECOY 
 
The introduction (i.e., definition of the attributes, market ranges) to each of the three types of 
choice matrices is identical. The unacceptability of the decoy option is manipulated by the 
presence/absence of the CE label (see cells with black frame).  
 




Wait staff  
(friendly, helpful, attentive) 
Ambiance/Décor 
 
Check the restaurant  that you 
would pick for dinner 
(check only one) 
Restaurant N 4.4 59 Yes □ 




Wait staff  
(friendly, helpful, attentive) 
Ambiance/Décor 
 
Check the restaurant  that you 
would pick for dinner 
(check only one) 
Restaurant N 4.4 59 Yes □ 
Restaurant M 3.7 74 Yes □ 
Restaurant O 3.1 67 Yes □ 
 
BLACK UNACCEPTABLE DECOY 
Restaurant 
Wait staff  
(friendly, helpful, attentive) 
Ambiance/Décor 
 
Check the restaurant  that you 
would pick for dinner 
(check only one) 
Restaurant N 4.4 59 Yes □ 
Restaurant M 3.7 74 Yes □ 
Restaurant O 3.1 67 No □ 
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APPENDIX 3: 
STUDY 1 – UNACCEPTABILITY RATING OF THE LABEL 
 
When choosing between these three restaurants I perceived the ABSENCE OF THE CLEANLINESS 
LABEL as follows (check only one):  
□ Truly unacceptable 
(This means you would immediately reject a restaurant without cleanli-
ness label, NO MATTER WHAT ELSE IT HAD TO OFFER) 
□ Acceptable, but it had to be off-set by another feature of the restaurant 
(This means that you would NOT immediately reject a restaurant without 
cleanliness label AS LONG AS IT IS ATTRACTIVE ON OTHER ATTRIBUTES 
(e.g., good ambiance/ appealing décor). Compensation by another feature 
of the restaurant is thus required to make a restaurant without cleanliness 
label an acceptable option) 
□ Acceptable, but it influenced the degree of preference in a negative way 
(This means that you would NOT immediately reject a restaurant without 
cleanliness label. The absence of the cleanliness label does NOT have to 
be off-set by another feature of the restaurant to make it an acceptable 
option, but will CAUSE THE PREFERENCE FOR THAT ALTERNATIVE TO BE 
LOWER. The presence/absence of the cleanliness label will thus only in-
fluence the degree of preference for an alternative that is acceptable any-
how) 
□ Irrelevant to my choice 
(This means that you would NOT immediately reject a restaurant without 
cleanliness label. In fact, whether the cleanliness label is present or not 
leaves you indifferent) 
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APPENDIX 4: 
STUDY 1 – CONTINUOUS ATTRIBUTES AND THEIR LEVELS 
FOR EACH OF THE 11 PRODUCT CATEGORIES FOR BOTH 




CD PLAYER  
(rangetrack programming = 0-56; rangenumber of disks = 0-40) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
CD player Track programming Number of disks 
 
Check the CD player that you 
would buy 
(check only one) 
CD player B 32 4 Yes □ 
CD player A 24 10 Yes □ 
CD player C 16 8 Yes □ 
 
COMPROMISE 
CD player Track programming Number of disks 
 
Check the CD player that you 
would buy 
(check only one) 
CD player B 32 4 Yes □ 
CD player A 24 10 Yes □ 
CD player D 12 20 Yes □ 
 
                                                 
 
17
 Acceptable setting 
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DIGITAL CAMERA 
(rangestorage size = 4-192; rangeoptical zoom = 0X-10X) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Digital camera 




Check the digital camera  that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Digital camera J 96 2X Yes □ 
Digital camera I 64 3.6X Yes □ 








Check the digital camera  that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Digital camera J 96 2X Yes □ 
Digital camera I 64 3.6X Yes □ 




(rangeprocessor speed = 0.8-3.06; rangehard drive capacity = 3.1-110) 




Hard drive capacity 
(gigabyte)  
Check the portable PC that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Portable PC b 2.8 20 Yes □ 
Portable PC a  2.4 40 Yes □ 






Hard drive capacity 
(gigabyte)  
Check the portable PC that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Portable PC b 2.8 20 Yes □ 
Portable PC a 2.4 40 Yes □ 
Portable PC d 1.9 65 Yes □ 
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MICROWAVE 
(rangecooking power = 550-1450; rangeease of use = 25-95, scored between 0 and 100 by Consumer 
Reports) 




Ease of use 
 
Check the microwave oven 
that you would buy 
(check only one) 
Microwave n  1050 67 Yes □ 
Microwave m 900 77 Yes □ 






Ease of use 
 
Check the microwave oven 
that you would buy 
(check only one) 
Microwave n 1050 67 Yes □ 
Microwave m 900 77 Yes □ 
Microwave p 650 94 Yes □ 
 
CORNFLAKES 
(rangetaste = 45-95, scored between 0 and 100 by Consumer Reports; rangecalories = 80-260, per 
serving of 55 gram) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Cornflakes Taste 
Calories 
(cal per serving) 
Made with GMI 
Check the cornflakes that 
you would buy  
(check only one) 
Cornflakes F 79 220 No □ 
Cornflakes E 71 180 No □ 





(cal per serving) 
Made with GMI 
Check the cornflakes that 
you would buy  
(check only one) 
Cornflakes F 79 220 No □ 
Cornflakes E 71 180 No □ 
Cornflakes H 60 125 No □ 
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POTATO CHIPS 
(rangetaste = 40-95, scored between 0 and 100 by Consumer Reports; rangecalories = 420-1330, 
per bag of 200 gram) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Potato chips Taste 
Calories 
(cal per bag) 
Made with GMI 
Check the potato chips that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Potato chips V 91 1020 No □ 
Potato chips U  82 870 No □ 
Potato chips W  76 945 No □ 
 
COMPROMISE 
Potato chips  Taste 
Calories 
(cal per bag) 
Made with GMI 
Check the potato chips that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Potato chips V  91 1020 No □ 
Potato chips U 82 870 No □ 
Potato chips X  69 653 No □ 
 
RESTAURANT 
(rangewait staff = 0-5, based on five-point scale taken from restaurant evaluation study; rangeam-
biance/décor = 10-100, based on 100-point scale taken from restaurant evaluation study) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Restaurant 
Wait staff  
(friendly, helpful, attentive) 
Ambiance/Décor 
 
Check the restaurant that you 
would pick for dinner 
(check only one) 
Restaurant N 4.4 59 Yes □ 
Restaurant M 3.7 74 Yes □ 




Wait staff  
(friendly, helpful, attentive) 
Ambiance/Décor 
 
Check the restaurant that you 
would pick for dinner 
(check only one) 
Restaurant N 4.4 59 Yes □ 
Restaurant M 3.7 74 Yes □ 
Restaurant P 2.6 97 Yes □ 
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OVERNIGHT ACCOMMODATION  
(rangedécor/character = 40-90, scored between 0 and 100 by Michelin; rangedistance to places worth visiting 
= 0-70) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Overnight accomm. Décor/character 
Distance to places 
worth visiting 
(minutes using public 
transport) 
 
Check the overnight ac-
comm. that you would pick 
(check only one) 
Overnight accomm. j 85 36 Yes □ 
Overnight accomm. i 77 24 Yes □ 
Overnight accomm. k 72 30 Yes □ 
 
COMPROMISE 
Overnight accomm. Décor/character 
Distance to places 
worth visiting 
(minutes using public 
transport) 
 
Check the overnight ac-
comm. that you would pick 
(check only one) 
Overnight accomm. j 85 36 Yes □ 
Overnight accomm. i 77 24 Yes □ 
Overnight accomm. l 66 8 Yes □ 
 
STUDENT ROOM 
(rangedistance to campus = 0.5-74; rangesize = 9-28) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Student room 
Distance to campus  





Check the student room that 
you would pick 
(check only one) 
Student room R  11 16.1 Yes □ 
Student room Q  25 19.2 Yes □ 




Distance to campus  





Check the student room that 
you would pick 
(check only one) 
Student room R  11 16.1 Yes □ 
Student room Q  25 19.2 Yes □ 
Student room T  44 23.5 Yes □ 
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PAPER TOWEL 
(rangestrength = 20-95, scored between 0 and 100 by Consumer Reports; rangeabsorption = 35-96, 
scored between 0 and 100 by Consumer Reports) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Paper towel Strength Absorption 
 
Check the paper towel that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Paper towel f 91 70 Yes □ 
Paper towel e 78 80 Yes □ 
Paper towel g 71 75 Yes □ 
 
COMPROMISE 
Paper towel Strength Absorption 
 
Check the paper towel that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Paper towel f 91 70 Yes □ 
Paper towel e 78 80 Yes □ 




(rangeweight = 80-160; rangebrightness = 55-95, scored between 0 and 100 by Consumer Reports) 








Check the printer paper that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Printer paper r  115 73 Yes □ 
Printer paper q  100 79 Yes □ 










Check the printer paper that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Printer paper r  115 73 Yes □ 
Printer paper q  100 79 Yes □ 
Printer paper t  80 87 Yes □ 
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APPENDIX 5: 
STUDY 1 – SCREENSHOTS 
 
SCREENSHOT RESTAURANT CHOICE: DESCRIPTION OF ATTRIBUTES AS IN 
SURVEY 
 
SCREENSHOT RESTAURANT CHOICE: CHOICE MATRIX, INCLUDING ABSENCE 
OF CLEANLINESS LABEL 
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APPENDIX 6: 
PRESENTATION OF A TRULY UNACCEPTABLE OPTION WITH 
RED LEVELS IN A CHOICE MATRIX: COMPUSA.COM  
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APPENDIX 7: 
STUDY 2 – UNACCEPTABILITY RATING OF THE ATTRIBUTE 
LEVELS IN THE CHOICE MATRIX 
 
Restaurants probably exist that you would NEVER EVEN CONSIDER VISITING because of the 
presence of TRULY UNACCEPTABLE scores? An attribute level is “truly unacceptable” if you 
would IMMEDIATELY reject a restaurant with that level, NO MATTER how it scores on the OTH-
ER attributes (e.g., a microwave oven which measures widthwise 45 centimeters, whereas your kitchen can accommodate 
one of only 30 centimeters is immediately rejected, no matter how it scores on the other attributes). 
 
Below a table will be shown, including different alternatives and how they score on the attrib-
utes wait staff, ambiance/décor and cleanliness. Please mark truly unacceptable scores in col-
umns 2 to 4, ánd the corresponding truly unacceptable alternatives in column 5. Notice that 
you are FREE TO INDICATE ANY NUMBER of unacceptable levels per option and free to mark any 




1. Check the scores that are truly unacceptable to you 
 (free to mark 0, 1, 2 or 3 levels per option) 
Restaurant 
Wait staff  
(friendly, helpful, attentive) 
Ambiance/Décor 
 
2. Mark the restaurants you would 
never even consider visiting 
 (free to mark 0, 1, 2 or 3 options)  
Restaurant N 4.4 □ 59 □ Yes □ □ 
Restaurant M 3.7 □ 74 □ Yes □ □ 
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APPENDIX 8: 
STUDY 2 – CHOICE MATRIX: RED UNACCEPTABLE DECOY 
 
Restaurant 
Wait staff  
(friendly, helpful, attentive) 
Ambiance/Décor 
 
Check the restaurant  that you 
would pick for dinner 
(check only one) 
Restaurant N 4.4 59 Yes □ 
Restaurant M 3.7 74 Yes □ 
Restaurant O 3.1 67 * No □ 
* red means the score is TRULY UNACCEPTABLE to you 
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APPENDIX 9: 
STUDY 2 – CONTINUOUS ATTRIBUTES AND THEIR LEVELS 






(rangewait staff = 0-5, based on five-point scale taken from restaurant evaluation study; rangeam-
biance/décor = 10-100, based on 100-point scale taken from restaurant evaluation study) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Restaurant 
Wait staff  
(friendly, helpful, attentive) 
Ambiance/Décor 
 
Check the restaurant  that you 
would pick for dinner 
(check only one) 
Restaurant N 4.4 59 Yes □ 
Restaurant M 3.7 74 Yes □ 
Restaurant O 3.1 67 No □ 
 
PORTABLE PC 
(rangeprocessor speed = 0.8-3.06; rangehard drive capacity = 3.1-110) 




Hard drive capacity 
(gigabyte)  
Check the portable PC that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Portable PC b 2.8 20 Yes □ 
Portable PC a  2.4 40 Yes □ 
Portable PC c 2.2 30 No □ 
 
                                                 
 
18
 Unacceptable setting 
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APPENDIX 10: 
STUDY 2 – SCREENSHOTS 
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SCREENSHOT RESTAURANT CHOICE: CHOICE MATRIX, ABSENCE OF CLEANLI-
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APPENDIX 11: 
STUDY 3 – CHOICE MATRIX: NO DECOY, ACCEPTABLE DECOY, 
BLACK UNACCEPTABLE DECOY, RED UNACCEPTABLE DECOY 
The introduction (i.e., definition of the attributes, market ranges) to each of the different types 
of choice matrices is identical. The unacceptability of the decoy option is manipulated by 
whether the friend defines a medium-sized camera as truly unacceptable or not at the outset of 
the experiment (see black frames in the text below).   
 
Specification of the best friend’s demands and preferences: 
 
NO DECOY – BLACK UNACCEPTABLE DECOY – RED UNACCEPTABLE DECOY 
Imagine a close friend has asked you to buy him/her a digital photo camera. You agree, and 
listen very carefully to the DEMANDS AND PREFERENCES put forward by your friend with re-
gard to the camera:  
“Well, I want you to buy me a digital photo camera. I definitely want a pocket-sized 
model. Any larger ( medium - or SLR-size) or smaller (watch-size) model is truly unac-
ceptable to me, so I don’t want you to buy such a camera for me no matter what else it 




Imagine a close friend has asked you to buy him/her a digital photo camera. You agree, and 
listen very carefully to the DEMANDS AND PREFERENCES put forward by your friend with re-
gard to the camera:  
“Well, I want you to buy me a digital photo camera. I definitely want a pocket- or me-
dium -sized model. Any larger (SLR-size) or smaller (watch-size) model is truly unac-
ceptable to me, so I don’t want you to buy such a camera for me no matter what else it 
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Four types of choice matrices: 
 
NO DECOY 
Digital camera Size Reliability 
Resolution 
(megapixels) 
Check the digital camera  that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Digital camera A Pocket 14.40 7.60 □ 
Digital camera B Pocket 16.60 5.40 □ 
  
ACCEPTABLE DECOY – BLACK UNACCEPTABLE DECOY 
Digital camera Size Reliability 
Resolution 
(megapixels) 
Check the digital camera  that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Digital camera A Pocket 14.40 7.60 □ 
Digital camera B Pocket 16.60 5.40 □ 
Digital camera C Medium 18.05 3.95 □ 
 
RED UNACCEPTABLE DECOY 
Digital camera Size Reliability 
Resolution 
(megapixels) 
Check the digital camera  that 
you would buy 
(check only one) 
Digital camera A Pocket 14.40 7.60 □ 
Digital camera B Pocket 16.60 5.40 □ 
Digital camera C * Medium 18.05 3.95 □ 
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APPENDIX 12: 
STUDY 3 – UNACCEPTABILITY RATING OF THE ATTRIBUTE 
LEVELS IN THE CHOICE MATRIX 
 
At the outset of this study you have chosen a digital photo camera for your friend out of a set 
of three. Please try to relive this moment while answering the following question.  
 
While choosing you might have treated one or more of the attribute levels in the choice table 
as truly unacceptable. A level is defined as “truly unacceptable” if it is so disliked that “if a 
camera has it, you would immediately reject it as an alternative, no matter what else it has to 
offer”.  
 
Below the attribute levels are shown as presented in the initial choice table. Please mark those 
levels that you perceived as “truly unacceptable” while choosing the best possible buy for 
your friend. Note that you are free to indicate any number of levels (max. 9), including none 
at all. 
  
□ Pocket □ 14.40 □ 7.60 
□ Pocket □ 16.60 □ 5.40 
□ Medium □ 18.05 □ 3.95 
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APPENDIX 13: 
STUDY 3 – CONTINUOUS ATTRIBUTES AND THEIR LEVELS 
FOR THE DIGITAL PHOTO CAMERA CATEGORY FOR BOTH 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE AND COMPROMISE 
 
DIGITAL PHOTO CAMERA 
 (rangesize = watch-size, pocket-size, medium-size, SLR-size ; rangereliability
19
 = 11-20, scored 
on a 20-point scale by Consumer Reports; rangeresolution
20
 = 2-11) 
ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE  
Digital photo camera Size Reliability 
Resolution 
(megapixels) 
Check the digital photo cam-
era that you would buy 
(check only one) 
Digital photo camera A Pocket 14.40 7.60 □ 
Digital photo camera B Pocket 16.60 5.40 □ 
Digital photo camera C Medium 16.60 3.95 □ 
 
COMPROMISE 
Digital photo camera Size Reliability 
Resolution 
(megapixels) 
Check the digital photo cam-
era that you would buy 
(check only one) 
Digital photo camera A Pocket 14.40 7.60 □ 
Digital photo camera B Pocket 16.60 5.40 □ 
Digital photo camera C Medium 18.05 3.95 □ 
 
                                                 
 
19
 … the higher the score, the better the repair history, and the higher the odds of getting a reliable camera. 
20
 … with more megapixels, one can obtain better image quality, and make larger prints or enlarge parts of an 
image without losing details or quality. 
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APPENDIX 14: 
STUDY 3 – SCREENSHOTS 
 
SCREENSHOT - FRIEND’S DEMANDS AND PREFERENCES: HOW TO TREAT THE 
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SCREENSHOT - DIGITAL PHOTO CAMERA CHOICE: CHOICE MATRIX, UNAC-
CEPTABLE MEDIUM SIZE LEVEL PRINTED IN RED 
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